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Abstract
We introduce relative concerns in the form of conspicuous con-
sumption in a standard economic geography model a la Krugman.
The primary intuition is that conspicuous consumption imposes a neg-
ative externality on some agents and generates a centrifugal force. We
show that this is not always the case as the relative concern also rises
the demand for the sophisticated good, strengthening the standard
centripetal market size e¤ect. We show that the resulting force is
very sensitive to the topology of the network of conspicuous links
in each region and on the level of economic integration. For instance,
with relatively large shares of income devoted to the consumption of
the standard good, we show that when trade is moderately costly and
classes of workers are segregated, relative concerns tends to stabilize
the symmetric equilibrium; on the other hand, if workers of di¤erent
classes interact via their relative concerns, conspicuous consumption
is a centripetal force generating stable fully or partially agglomerated
equilibria. Finally, when the level of integration is high, the intuition
holds and even small relative concerns destabilize the full agglomera-
tion equilibrium, which is stable in the Krugman model.
Christian Ghiglino, University of Essex, UK. Email: cghig@essex.ac.uk. Antonella
Nocco, University of Salento (Lecce), Italy. Email: antonella.nocco@unisalento.it. We are
grateful to Gianmarco Ottaviano for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
The understanding of the forces shaping economic geography has mainly fo-
cused on the production of goods and services, on their exchange via markets
and on the ow of inputs, particularly labour. In this literature, social in-
teraction typically does not play a major role, surprisingly not even in the
determinant of migration. Clearly, location decisions of agents depend on
the perceived well being. And a recurrent theme is that, in addition to own
consumption and leisure, well being appears to depend on the consumption
of others with whom we interact and compare ourselves. The aim of the
present paper is to shed some light on the role of this type of social interac-
tion on city dynamics and migration. In doing so the paper is a contribution
to what Duranton (2008) considers as one of the major challenges for spa-
tial economics: the development of a theory of proximitythat explains why
direct interactions between economic agents matter and how.
Traditionally, migration ows have been explained by models that focus
on the role of economic di¤erences between countries of origin and of des-
tination with no attention devoted to the role of social interactions among
individuals.1 Indeed, as pointed out by Radu (2008), it is commonly accepted
that the traditional approach fails to take into account that migration de-
cisions can be inuenced by the actual or intentional migration choices in
ones peer group (endogenous e¤ects) or by the groups specic characteristics
(contextual e¤ects). The e¤ect of social interaction on migration decisions
has started to attract more attention in recent years.2 It has been acknowl-
edged that agents do evaluate their income not only in absolute terms but
1As an example, in the selection model of migration by Borjas (1987), one of the
main determinants of the size of migration rates is income inequality in the origin and
in the destination countries. See Borjas (1994) for a discussion on several aspects of the
economics of immigration.
2See Radu (2008) for a survey.
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also in comparison with others and that this may change the migration de-
cisions substantially (Stark and Taylor (1991) is an inuential paper in this
area). More recently, Quinn (2006) shows relative deprivation is a signi-
cative factor in domestic migration decisions among Mexicans. We depart
from this body of research as we look at the general equilibrium e¤ects of the
social comparisons, including its e¤ect on prices and wages, and therefore are
able to address the full role of social interaction on city dynamics. Secondly,
our work explores the role of the ner city organization, particularly the level
of segregation among its citizen.
In the rst step to build a model of location with relative concerns, we are
guided by the literature of new economic geography, which developed since
the publication of Krugmans (1991) seminal work. This literature explains
the riddle of unequal spatial development and claries many of the microeco-
nomic underpinnings of both spatial economic agglomerations and regional
imbalances at di¤erent spatial levels. This has been achieved by combin-
ing imperfect competition, increasing returns, and trade costs in full-edged
general equilibrium models that describe how the interactions of centripetal
and centrifugal forces determine the locational decisions of rms and workers
between two or more regions involved in trade.
In this work we adopt the "footloose entrepreneur" model proposed by
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).3 In particular, we consider an economy that
consists of two regions populated by immobile unskilled workers, and by in-
terregionally mobile skilled workers, each supplying his/her specic type of
labour inelastically. Skilled workers can be thought as self-employed entre-
preneurs that move freely between the two regions. Two types of goods are
produced and exchanged in the model. The agricultural good is produced un-
der perfect competition with constant returns to scale and is freely exchanged
between them. There is also a continuum of varieties of a modern manufac-
tured good: each variety is produced by a monopolistically competitive rm
with increasing returns to scale employing both skilled and unskilled workers.
We assume that there are trade costs: to import one unit of a variety in each
region,  > 1 units have to be shipped from the other region.
Agents care about the consumption of both types of goods but also about
3We choose this particular model because of its analytical tractability and because it
turns out to be isomorphic to the core-periphery model by Krugman (2001).
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the consumption of the manufactured good by other agents. Introducing for-
mally relative concerns in this model is relatively easy. The empirical analy-
sis4 has shown that relative concerns are important only within "neighbours",
where the neighbourhood generating the reference group, are friends, family
etc. See for example, Blanchower and Oswald (2004), Layard (2005) and
(Kuhn, Kooreman, Soetevent, Kapten (2008)). Another interesting study is
provided by Luttmer (2005) who nds that changes in the incomes of neigh-
bors have e¤ects on self-reported levels of individual happiness and that the
magnitude of these e¤ects depends on the frequency of interaction with the
neighbours. We will describe these neighborhood by a network of links rep-
resenting the channels along which comparisons take place. More precisely,
in the present model, agents care not only about their consumption of the
di¤erentiated good but also about each of those of their neighbours, as de-
scribed by the network. The network of conspicuous e¤ects of consumption
describes agents that are both geographically and socially close.
The primary intuition is that introducing conspicuous consumption should
strengthen the centrifugal force because the comparison to others consump-
tion exerts a direct negative externality. In the paper we show that the
presence of the conspicuous good e¤ect also tends to strengthen the two cen-
tripetal forces at work in the original model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003),
and, as result, it may contradict the intuition. In particular, we nd that
when a worker moves in a region, the demand for each rm in this region
(determined for a given wage and price index) increases not only because of
the presence of the same worker, as in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), but also
because all other workers increase their demand according to the conspic-
uous good e¤ect. This larger increase in the demand per rm strengthens
the market size e¤ect, produces a larger increase in operating prots of
rms, which nally translates into higher real wages that attract more work-
ers. The other two forces operating in the traditional model, i.e., the cost of
living and the market crowding, are also strengthened.
Which of these e¤ects prevails depends on the level of economic inte-
gration between the two regions, because this determines the degree of lo-
calization of the e¤ects of relative concerns. Specically, the introduction of
conspicuous good e¤ects, which increase the demand for di¤erentiated goods,
4There is also a vast theoretical literature. Among the many, see e.g., Abel (1990),
Frey and Stutzer (2002), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Arrow and Dasgupta (2007) and
Ghiglino and Goyal (2010).
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acts in a stronger way in the larger market when trade costs are high tending
to destabilize the symmetric equilibrium. On the contrary, when trade costs
are low the conspicuous good e¤ects are less localized: in this case an increase
in the demand for di¤erentiated goods due to relative concerns spills over to
the other region, because imports from this region become cheaper.
In the analysis in Sections 2-4 and 6.1-6.2 we consider a very simple
network structure. Indeed, the economy is composed of two complete "re-
gional" regular networks. These are endogenously determined and are equal
in the case of the symmetric equilibrium and di¤erent in partially or fully
agglomerated equilibria. Except for the symmetric equilibrium, the global
equilibrium network, composed by the two regional networks, has a core-
periphery structure. Of course, in the case of the symmetric equilibrium this
is a regular network with each agent having the same number of links (neigh-
bors). We show that for low trade costs, relative concerns tends to destabilize
the full agglomeration equilibrium and stabilize the symmetric equilibrium.
For medium and high trade costs, relative concerns tends to destabilize the
symmetric equilibrium and stabilize the agglomeration equilibrium.
We pursue further our analysis and depart from complete regional net-
works, obtaining new interesting results. Indeed, it is plausible that workers
in a given region do not compare themselves with all other agents in that
region but rather to a subset of them. The details of the network of compar-
isons may play here an important role. We rst consider the case in which
di¤erent ethnic groups, or workers in di¤erent sectors of the economy, are as-
sociated to di¤erent networks of relationships and therefore react di¤erently
to the interpersonal comparisons, and ultimately a¤ect city dynamics. In this
case we nd that: (i) with free trade (full integration) economic activity is
dispersed (as in the case of the complete network); (ii) for intermediate trade
costs, the agglomeration equilibrium can be either favored or destabilized
by relative concerns; (iii) for high trade costs, the symmetric equilibrium is
always stable. We also consider the star network in which agents are only
a¤ected by the consumption of agents of the other type, that is the center
is connected to some agents of the other type, while these are not connected
among themselves.
Finally, we consider a mixed case in which agents choose between a region
with a complete network and a fully segregated region. An interesting pattern
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emerges: although for very high trade costs interior solutions may survive,
there is a strong tendency to observe full agglomeration in the integrated
region in specic situations.5 At the same time full agglomeration in the
segregated region can also coexists for intermediate trade costs.
So far, and in most of the analysis, it is assumed that: 1) individuals
compare their consumption with the average consumption of the reference
group, 2) there is a linear e¤ect of the size of the reference group on the
strength of the e¤ect. However, it is often assumed that the agent only cares
about the deviations from his/her consumption and the average consumption
of his/her neighbours. In the last Section of the paper we investigate how
our previous results are a¤ected by this modication.
With the complete network and no size e¤ect, the direct centrifugal e¤ect
of relative concerns is weaker than in the additive specication. Thus, when
the coupling parameter that measures the strength of relative concerns is
su¢ ciently large, their overall e¤ect stabilizes agglomeration for low levels
of trade costs when skilled population is above some threshold level. This
because the centrifugal force does not increase with the size of the skilled
population (as there are no group size e¤ect), while the centripetal market
size e¤ect increases favoring partial or full agglomeration. If, instead, skilled
population is below the same threshold level, the centripetal market size e¤ect
is weaker and the symmetric equilibrium is stabilized by relative concerns for
low levels of trade costs. The centripetal market size e¤ect is also weaker
when the strength of relative concerns is relatively low, so that in this case
the symmetric equilibrium is stable for low levels of trade costs for any value
of the population. Note that with linear group size e¤ects the value of the
population is not relevant in determining if the symmetric equilibrium is
stable for high level of integration. Finally, with the complete network and
no size e¤ect, full agglomeration is never stable for high trade costs and
it is stable for intermediate or low levels of costs. Without size e¤ects in
the segregated networks, relative concerns favour agglomeration destabilizing
the symmetric equilibrium for intermediate trade costs and do not favour
dispersion with low trade costs. This because, the centrifugal force generated
by relative concerns is weak without group size e¤ect and only the centripetal
5We will show that this is true, for instance, when consumers devote a relatively high
value of their income (net of the conspicuous e¤ect) to acquire the di¤erentiated good,
and when the proportion of unskilled workers is large.
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market size e¤ect produces relevant e¤ects. Numerical analysis shows that
the same type of results holds with the star networks without group size
e¤ects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the new
economic geography model modied to take into account relative concerns.
In Section 3 we dene our equilibrium and stability concepts. In Section 4
we present our ndings and discuss the properties of the equilibria of the
model when the network in each region is complete with linear size e¤ects.
In Section 5 we extend the analysis to asymmetric networks. In Section 6 we
modify the specication chosen for the utility function assuming that each
agent cares about the average of his/her neighbours. Section 7 concludes.
Most of the proofs are contained in the Appendixes.
2 The general model
We consider an economy that consists of two regions indexed by r = 1; 2 ,
populated by a mass L1 + L2 = 2L of immobile unskilled workers, and a
mass H1 +H2 = H of interregionally mobile skilled workers, each supplying
inelastically one unit of his/her specic type of labour. We assume that
unskilled workers are evenly distributed between the two regions, with Lr =
L. Skilled workers can be thought as self-employed entrepreneurs, as in the
footloose entrepreneur model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), that move
freely between the two regions, with their level in each region endogenously
determined and given by Hr and Hv = H   Hr, with v = 1; 2 and r 6= v.
Wages perceived by skilled and unskilled workers in region r are, respectively,
given by wHr and wLr .
Two goods are produced and exchanged in the model. The agricultural
good is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale
employing one unit of unskilled labour to obtain one unit of output and it
is homogeneous across the two regions and freely exchanged between them.
The price pAr of the agriculture good in region r is chosen as the numeraire.
Therefore, the unskilled wage, wLr , is equal to 1 in both regions (wLr =
pAr = 1). There is also a mass N of varieties of a modern manufactured
good: each variety is produced by a monopolistically competitive rm with
increasing returns to scale employing both skilled and unskilled workers.
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2.1 The demand side
Each individual i located in region r consumes the quantity Air of the agri-
cultural good, and a mass N of varieties of the manufactured good, with each
variety denoted by index s and consumed in quantity Xir(s). The di¤erenti-
ated varieties are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution function
in Xir. We assume that agents care not only about their consumption of
the di¤erentiated good Xir, but also about those of their neighbours X ir in
the same region r. We note r(i) the set of direct neighbours/acquaintances
to agent i in region r, which are also denoted by  i. In other words, we
assume that there is a conspicuous e¤ect of consumption and that it a¤ects
only agents that are both geographically and socially close.
Given these assumptions, and adapting Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) to the
continuous case, we assume that workerspreferences are represented by the
following utility function
U(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i))) = A
1 
ir ( (Xir; X ir;r(i)))
 with 0 <  < 1
(1)
where
X ir =
Z
r(i)
Xjrdj
and  : R  R D ! R, with Xjr denoting the consumption of the di¤er-
entiated good by individual j 2 r(i), with the average consumption in his
neighbourhood, r(i) 2 D an element of the subset D of the real line. The
specication of r(i) will be rened when considering specic networks and
the size e¤ect.
Note that this formulation appears to be the interesting case to consider;
see Frank (2007) for a discussion on di¤erences in social sensitiveness across
goods and Kuhn et al. (2008) for evidence that relative consumption e¤ects
are prominent with some goods but not others. It is also natural to assume
that if consumption externalities are symmetric for both goods, then the
social comparisons will simply wash out and equilibrium will be analogous to
the equilibrium in an economy with no consumption externalities (see Arrow
and Dasgupta (2007)).
For xed set of neighbours, the function  is increasing in Xir and de-
creasing in X ir: Individuals care about their consumption relative to the
average consumption of their neighbors, but this e¤ect might be weighted by
a term S(
(r(i))) characterizing the size of the neighborhood. We assume
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that S() is an arbitrary non decreasing function taking values between 0 and

(r(i)), with 
(r(i)) denoting the Lebesgue measure of the set of neigh-
bours. We will focus on the two polar cases: the additive specication with
S(
(r(i))) = 
(r(i)), and the average specication with S(
(r(i))) = 1.6
These considerations are reected in the following general formulation, which
is valid when r(i) 6= ;:7
 (Xir; X ir;r(i)) = Xir + S(
(r(i)))
"
Xir  
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj
#
: (2)
Some remarks are in order here. When the conspicuous e¤ect is absent,
that is when  = 0, we fall back to the Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) model.8
When  > 0, individuals are negatively a¤ected by the consumption of their
neighbors; and  < 0 corresponds to a positive externality. We will focus
on the case  > 0, because it captures the idea that individuals are nega-
tively a¤ected by an increase in consumption by neighbors. Importantly, we
highlight the role of S(
(r(i))). If S(
(r(i))) = 
(r(i)) then the e¤ect
of the size of the neighborhood is linear, whereas if S(
(r(i))) = 1 only
the average consumption of neighbors matters. We focus on these two polar
cases because they help us clarify the types of e¤ects at work; however, we
recognize that the intermediate specication with a small size e¤ect is more
realistic.
The total mass of produced varieties N , is the sum of the mass of varieties
produced in region r, nr, and the mass of varieties produced in region v, nv.
The horizontally di¤erentiated manufactured good consumed by individual i
in region r is given by
Xir =
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1 (3)
where  > 1 is both the elasticity of demand of any variety and the elasticity
of substitution between any two varieties.
Let pkr(s) be the price of a manufactured good s produced in k = 1; 2
and sold in r. Given the price for the agricultural good pAr = 1 and his/her
6The rst systematic analysis of the size e¤ect in relative concerns was done in Ghiglino
and Goyal (2010). More recently, Liu et al. (2011) also consider this issue.
7If r(i) = 0 then obviously (Xir; X ir) = Xir.
8Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) assume that Lr = L=2 and H = 1.
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income wir, the problem of a consumer i in region r is to maximize the utility
function in (1) subject to the budget constraint
Air +
Z
s2N
pkr(s)Xir(s)ds = wir (4)
In Appendix I (I.B) it is shown that then the individual demand in region r
for variety s produced in k is given by
Xikr(s) =
pkr(s)
 
p1 Xr
Eir (5)
where Eir = pXrXir is the individual expenditure on manufactures in region
r and pXr is the local price index of manufactures in r dened as follows
pXr =
0@ Z
s2nr
prr(s)
1 ds+
Z
s2nv
pvr(s)
1 ds
1A 11  (6)
From the consumers problem in Appendix I (I.A), we also nd that the
consumer demand for agriculture in region r is
Air = (1  )
 
wir   pXr
S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj
!
(7)
and that the individual demand of manufactures in region r is
Xir =

pXr
 
wir + pXr
1  

S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj
!
(8)
Let us dene the wage net of the conspicuous e¤ect of individual i in region
r as follows
Wir  wir   pXr
S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj
(9)
Notice that Wir must be positive to ensure the positivity of the demand
for the agricultural good in (7).9 Furthermore, the individual demand for
agriculture in region r can be rewritten as follows
Air = (1  )Wir, (10)
9When performing the numerical analysis, we choose values of  su¢ ciently small for
the given values of the other parameters that ensure that Wir is positive.
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while the individual demand of manufactures in region r (8) is
Xir =

pXr
Wir +
S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj
(11)
Expressions (10) and (11) show that for given prices and wages, the demand
in both goods depend linearly on the wage net of the conspicuous consump-
tion e¤ect,Wir. This decomposition highlights the loss in disposable income
as agents waste part of their income only to adjust their own consumption
to the consumption of their neighbours. In particular, it shows that there is
a fall in the demand of the ordinary good.
Concerning the di¤erentiated good, we see from (11) that the demand has
an additional term that increases with , for given consumption of neighbours
(
R
r(i)
Xjrdj). In fact, expression (8) shows that when  increases, this sec-
ond e¤ect dominates that produced by the reduction of Wir and, thus, the
individual demand Xir increases with .10
To simplify the analysis we restrict our attention to the case in which the
network of interactions within cities/regions is regular in the sense that all
agents of a given type in region r occupy equivalent positions and therefore
can be treated as identical. This implies that the consumption of the dif-
ferentiated good is equal for all skilled in region r, noted then Xir = XHr .
The same must be true for the unskilled, so that Xir = XLr . Consider now
a skilled agent i in region r. The term
R
r(i)
Xjrdj can be rewritten in this
case as Z
Hr
Xjrdj = hHr(Hr)XHr + lHr(Hr)XLr
where hHr(Hr) is the mass of high skilled neighbours to a high skill agent
in r, lHr(Hr) is the mass of low skilled neighbours to a high skill agent in r.
The mass of neighbours for the skilled agent i in r is then
Hr = hHr(Hr) + lHr(Hr)
10Moreover, if we dene Er(i)  pXr
R
r(i)
Xjrdj as the total expenditure on the di¤er-
entiated good by neighbours of individual i in region r, we can also point out what follows:
for given wages wir and total expenditures of neighbours of individual i in region r on
the di¤erentiated good Er(i), an increase in conspicuous consumption e¤ects (that is an
increase in ) reduces the share of wage used by individuals to buy the traditional good,
Air
wir
= (1  )

1  S(
(r(i)))1+S(
(r(i)))
Er(i)
wir
R
r(i)
dj

, and, consequently, increases the share of
wage used to buy the manufactured good.
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Note that these masses depend only on the total mass of skilled agents in
region r, because the network is regular and because the unskilled are im-
mobile. If, instead, i is an unskilled agent, the total consumption of his/her
neighbours is Z
Lr
Xjrdj = hLr(Hr)XHr + lLr(Hr)XLr
where hLr(Hr) is the mass of high skilled neighbours to a low skill agent in
region r, lLr(Hr) is the mass of low skilled neighbours to a low skill agent in
region r, and the total mass of neighbours for the unskilled agent i in r is
Lr = hLr(Hr) + lLr(Hr)
It is important to stress that we assume that the network in each region
is exogenously given, because agents choose to which region they migrate
but do not chose on the type of network that prevails in these regions. Still,
typically the masses hHr(Hr), hLr(Hr), lHr(Hr) and lLr(Hr) are endogenously
determined and depend on Hr. In the sequel we simplify notation and drop
the explicit dependence on Hr.
The individual demand of the di¤erentiated good by a skilled consumer in
region r , XHr , and that by an unskilled consumer in region r, XLr , depend
on the structure of the network and the size of the neighborhood S(). In
general, in Appendix I (I.C) we describe how we obtain the system (46) of
two equations that can be solved for a given structure of the network and
size of the neighborhood to nd XHr and XLr . Clearly, the quantities depend
on hHr , hLr , lHr and lHr . Finally, total demand for the di¤erentiated good in
region r, Xr, is given by
Xr = XHrHr +XLrL; (12)
while the total demand in region r for variety s produced in region k derived
from (5) and (12) is
Xkr(s) =
pkr(s)
 
p Xr
(XHrHr +XLrL) (13)
2.2 The supply side
Each manufacturing variety is produced by a monopolistically competitive
rm with increasing returns to scale employing both skilled and unskilled
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workers. Specically, to produce Qr(s) units of variety s the rm located
in region r incurs a xed input requirement of f units of skilled workers
independently of the production level, and Qr(s) units of unskilled workers.
The cost function for each rm producing variety s in region r is
TCr(s) = fwHr + Qr(s)
Given the xed input requirement, the mass of rms producing in region
r is proportional to the mass of its skilled residents with
nr =
Hr
f
(14)
To import one unit of a variety in each given region,  > 1 units have to
be shipped from the other region. Hence, prots for a rm producing variety
s in region r are given by the sum of revenues from the domestic (r) and the
foreign (v 6= r) region net of total cost of production
r(s) = prr(s)Xrr(s) + prv(s)Xrv(s)  fwHr    [Xrr(s) + Xrv(s)] (15)
From the rst order condition for the maximization of prots, we obtain that
the price set by the rm producing variety s for the domestic market r is
prr(s) =

   1 (16)
and the price set for the foreign market v is
prv(s) =

   1 (17)
for every r; v = 1; 2 and r 6= v.
Using (16) and (17), the price index in (6) becomes
pXr =

   1 (nr + nv)
1
1  (18)
where  =  1  2 [0; 1] is a direct measure of the freeness of trade, with its
value equal to zero when trade costs are prohibitively high ( ! 1), and
equal to 1 when markets are perfectly integrated ( = 1). Then, notice that
using equations (14), Hv = H  Hr and (18), the price indexes pXr and pXv
can be written as follows
pXr =

   1

1
f
 1
1 
[Hr + (H  Hr)]
1
1  (19)
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pXv =

   1

1
f
 1
1 
[(H  Hr) +Hr]
1
1  (20)
Wages for skilled are derived from the free entry condition, which implies
that prots in (15) are equal to zero in equilibrium with
wHr =
prr(s)Xrr(s) + prv(s)Xrv(s)   [Xrr(s) + Xrv(s)]
f
(21)
Using (16) and (17) we can rewrite the wage in (21) as follows
wHr =

( 1)f [Xrr(s) + Xrv(s)] =

( 1)fQr(s) (22)
where Qr(s)  Xrr(s)+Xrv(s) is the total production by the rm producing
variety s in region r. Finally, we can use (13), (16), (17), (19) and (20) to
obtain that the production of the rm producing variety s in r, Qr(s), is
Qr(s) = f

 1

XHrHr+XLrL
[Hr+(H Hr)]

 1
+ 
XHv (H Hr)+XLvL
[(H Hr)+Hr]

 1

3 Mobility decision and equilibrium
The indirect utility function for agent i, as obtained in Appendix I (I.A) is
U(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i))) =  [1 + S(
(r(i)))]
 Wir
(pXr)
 (23)
where   (1  )1  .
Taking into account that Hv = H   Hr and that WHr is the value
that Wir takes for skilled workers in region r, we can use (23) to analyze
the location decision of skilled workers. Formally, we need to consider the
logarithm of the ratio of the current indirect utility levels in region r with
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respect to region v, that is11
V (Hr; ; )  ln
24 (1+S(
(Hr )))WHrpXr
(1+S(
(Hv )))
WHv
pXv
35 = (24)
= ln

pXv
pXr
 
1+S(
(Hr ))
1+S(
(Hv ))
 WHr
WHv

where Hk = 
(k(i)) is the mass of neighbours to a skilled worker in region
k. From (19) and (20) we can see that the value of  does not directly
inuence the price indexes in the two regions in (24). However, it can have
an indirect e¤ect as it brings a change in the mass of skilled workers (and of
rms) in the two regions and therefore of Hr. Another indirect e¤ect may
come through the wage in (22).
In the model the notion of equilibrium is associated to the absence of
migration. We then dene a spatial equilibrium by _Hr = 0: In fact, the
decision of a worker to migrate depends on the value taken by the function
V . When 0 < Hr < H, if V (Hr; ; ) > 0 then a worker from region v will
move to region r while a worker from region r would not move. On the other
hand, if V (Hr; ; ) < 0 a worker from region r would migrate to region v.
Consequently, at an interior equilibrium we expect V (Hr; ; ) = 0. When
there is full agglomeration in region r, or in region v, that is Hr = H or Hr =
0, the dynamics is slightly more subtle. Formally, the process of migration is
determined by an equation of motion. Expressing time with t, and following
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), the migration process is summarized as follows
_Hr  dHr=dt =
8<:
V (Hr; ; ) if 0 < Hr < H
min f0; V (Hr; ; )g if Hr = H
max f0; V (Hr; ; )g if Hr = 0
(25)
According to the Samuelsons principle only stable equilibria deserve inter-
ests as they are the only one surviving an evolving environment. A spatial
equilibrium is stable if a deviation from the equilibrium, that is a deviation
of Hr from its equilibrium value, generates changes in Hr - described by the
11Alternatively, we could examine the location decision of skilled workers studying the
current indirect utility di¤erential, as in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). However, we choose
to work with the logarithm of the ratio of the current indirect utility levels because it gives
an expression that is analytically more tractable, which, in any case, identies the same
critical values of  for the sustainability of the di¤erent types of equilibria.
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equation of motion in (25) - that bring the distribution of workers back to
the original one. Hence, an interior equilibrium (0 < Hr < H) is stable only
if dV
dHr
(Hr; ; )  VHr (Hr; ; ) < 0. A corner conguration (Hr = 0 or
Hr = H) is an equilibrium as soon as V (0; ; ) < 0 or V (H;; ) > 0:
Therefore, a corner equilibrium is generically stable.
The function V (Hr; ; ) explicitly, but also implicitly through the wages,
depends on Hr and on the conspicuous e¤ect. Indeed, substituting (19) and
(20) into (24) we obtain that
V (Hr; ; )  ln
h
(H Hr)+Hr
Hr+(H Hr)
i 
1 

1+S(
(Hr ))
1+S(
(Hv ))

WHr
WHv

(26)
4 The complete network
The benchmark economy we investigate is one in which in each given region,
each worker compares his/her consumption with the average consumption
of all the agents in the region weighted by the measure of the comparison
group. In other words, the network in each region is complete (or integrated)
and S(
(r(i))) = 
(r(i)): This assumption implies that hHr = hLr = Hr
and lHr = lLr = L. As shown in Appendix I (I.C), equations (7) and (8) can
be used to show that the individual demand of the di¤erentiated good by a
skilled workers in region r is
XHr =

pXr
wHr +  (L+HrwHr) +  (wHr   1)L
1 +  (L+Hr)
(27)
and that by an unskilled workers living in the same region is
XLr =

pXr
1 +  (L+HrwHr)   (wHr   1)Hr
1 +  (L+Hr)
(28)
Moreover, from (12), (13), (16)-(18), (27) and (28) we nd that for a rm
producing variety s in region r, the aggregate local demand is
Xrr(s) = 
(   1) (L+HrwHr)
 (nr + nv)
1 + r
1 + r
(29)
while the aggregate foreign demand in region v is
Xrv(s) = 
(   1)   (L+HvwHv)
 (nv + nr)
1 + v
1 + v
(30)
with r; v = 1; 2 and r 6= v, and with the total number of neighbors in region
r and v respectively given by r = Hr + L and v = Hv + L.
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4.1 The new forces produced by conspicuous consump-
tion.
A rst insight on the e¤ect of relative concerns can be gained from equation
(29). Indeed, taking the derivative of Xrr(s) with respect to , we nd that
for a given distribution of workers (and consequently of rms) and for given
wages, the demand Xrr(s) increases with . Moreover, for xed wages, price
indexes and , an increase in Hr and in r, increase the demand Xrr(s),
the strength of this e¤ect being increasing in . This property is due to the
fact that the migration of skilled workers to a region induces the workers
in the region to increase their demand, larger values of  generating larger
increases.12
The increase in the demand implies that the operating prots of rms
producing in the same region increase. Finally, this produces an increase in
the wages received by workers employed in the region, a centripetal force.
To be more specic, consider a symmetric initial situation with Hr = H=2,
equal expenditures in the two regions (i.e., (L+HrwHr) and (L+HvwHv))
and equal price indexes (i.e., which imply given values of Hr + (H  Hr)
and (H  Hr) + Hr). In this case, the wage wHr given by expression (48)
in Appendix II (II.A) tends to increase as the number of neighbours in r
increases (because Hr increases). Interestingly, the extent of the increase of
wHr is larger when  is low, and is reduced as  increases.
13
12To show this, for given values of , of the wages and of the price indexes - which imply
a given value of (nr + nv), we evaluate the following expression
@Xrr(s)
@Hr
  @Xrr(s)@Hr

=0
=
=
@
 

( 1)(L+HrwHr )
(nr+nv)
1+(Hr+L)
1+(Hr+L)
!
@Hr
 
@
 

( 1)(L+HrwHr )
(nr+nv)
!
@Hr

=0
=
=  (1  ) (   1) L+2wHrHr+LwHr+wHr(L+Hr)2
(L+Hr+1)
2(nr+nv)
> 0
13Indeed, at the symmetric equilibrium (with Hr = H=2 and
(L+HrwHr )
Hr+(H Hr) =
(L+HvwHv )
(H Hr)+Hr ), for given total expenditures and price indexes, the sign of
@wHr
@Hr
with wHr =


(L+HrwHr )
Hr+(H Hr)
h
1+(Hr+L)
1+(Hr+L)
+  1+(H Hr+L)1+(H Hr+L)
i
is equal to the sign of
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To summarize, relative concerns strengthen the traditional centripetal
force identied as the market-size e¤ect in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
Consequently, this force intensies the process of agglomeration of workers
and rms in a region. While the modication of the two other traditional
forces in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) is discussed in Appendix I (I.D), here
we can state the following:
Lemma 1 The increase in the mass of skilled neighbors in a region induces
a positive e¤ect on demand per local rm, which rises skilled real wage. Rel-
ative concerns therefore strengthen the traditional market sizee¤ect in the
original core-periphery model as they produce a new centripetal force at-
tracting further skilled workers in the region.
Conspicuous consumption has also a more direct e¤ect on individual wel-
fare. Indeed, comparing the expression for V (Hr; ; ) in (26) when  > 0
with the case  = 0, we see that the introduction of relative concerns brings
in the factor 1+Hr
1+Hv
= 1+r
1+v
= 1+r
1+(H r+2L) that is increasing in the number
of neighbors r: Furthermore, relative concerns also modify the third factor,
as it a¤ects the wage net of relative concerns (see equation (9)). To analyze
this e¤ect, notice that the conspicuous e¤ect in WHr can be rewritten using
(27) and (28). Indeed, we can substitute the total amount of consumption
by the neighbours of skilled workers
R
Hr
Xjrdj = XHrHr +XLrL in the de-
nition of WHr in (9) and rewrite the wage of skilled workers net of the
conspicuous e¤ect. The following expression is obtained;14
WHr = wHr    L+HrwHr1+(L+Hr) (31)
@( 1+(Hr+L)1+(Hr+L) +
1+(H Hr+L)
1+(H Hr+L) )
@Hr
=  (1  ) (H+2L+2)2(1 )
4(L+Hr+1)
2(H+L Hr+1)2 > 0 which
is positive when  > 0. Let us notice that the extent of this increase is larger when  is
low, and that it becomes smaller when  increases.
14Let us observe that we can get an analogous expression for the wage of unskilled
workers net of the conspicuous e¤ect WLr . Specically, we can substitute the total
amount of consumptions by the neighbours of unskilled workers
R
r(i)
Xjrdj = XHrHr +
XLrL in the denition of WLr in (9) and obtain that
WLr  1   L+HrwHr1+(L+Hr)
This expression is important to check the positivity of agricultural demand by unskilled
workers in (7).
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Expression (31) shows that for a given skilled wage, WHr tends to decrease
when Hr increases.15 This identies the existence of a negative e¤ect on
WHr produced by the increase in the mass of skilled workers in a region
(i.e., Hr) in the presence of conspicuous good consumption. The presence of
this negative e¤ect tends to push skilled workers back to the region of origin,
and allows us to state the following.
Lemma 2 The increase in the mass of skilled workers in a region increases
the mass of neighbors and of their manufacturing consumption, inducing a
welfare loss on both skilled and unskilled workers that generates a new cen-
trifugal force for mobile skilled agents.
We can now focus our attention on the existence and stability of equilibria
in this model.
4.2 The existence and stability of equilibria
The model can generate several types of equilibria, that is, situations in which
agents are not willing to migrate. As in the standard core-periphery model,
it can be shown that the symmetric equilibrium, withHr = Hv = H=2 and all
variables assuming the same value in both regions, always exists as an interior
equilibrium. However, its stability depends on the underlying parameters.
To be stable the derivative of V (Hr; ; ) with respect toHr evaluated at the
symmetric equilibrium, that is VHr (H=2; ; ), must be negative. We assume
that the no black hole condition, that is  <  1, holds. This condition rules
out the case in which the symmetric equilibrium is never stable when relative
concerns are absent. Clearly, when  = 0, the sign of VHr (H=2; ; ) is equal
to that in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and the symmetric equilibrium is
stable only for  2 (0; FOb ) with FOb = ( 1 )( )(+)(+ 1) < 1 identifying the
symmetry breaking point. In Appendix II (II.A) we show that when  > 0
we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 In the case of the additive specication, S(
(r)) = 
(r);
with a complete network and conspicuous consumption e¤ects, the symmet-
ric equilibrium is always stable for high levels of the openness to trade .
15This is true when the skilled wage is above a minimum level smaller than 1, that is
for wHr > L=(1 + L).
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Focusing our attention to the case of full agglomeration equilibria, in
Appendix II (II.A) we verify that when  = 0 our model generates the same
sustain point s, i.e., the value of  such that full agglomeration is stable for
 > s, as in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). For  > 0 in the appendix it is
shown that the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 4 Assume that the network in each region is complete and
S(
(r)) = 
(r). Then for low trade costs, weak positive relative concerns
destroy full agglomeration. On the other hand, this equilibrium exists, and
is stable, for intermediate values of trade openness .
4.3 A general overview: the bifurcation diagram
To explore further the relationship between the strength of relative concerns
(), the openness to trade () and the existence and stability of the equilibria
we need to focus on calibratedversions of the model. First, the numerical
analysis is performed on a model in which L = 20, H = 10,  = 2 and
 = 0:4 (Figure 1:a) or  = 0:11 (Figure 1:b). The black curves represent
F = a0 as a function of  when  = 0. They show that in this case the
symmetric equilibrium is stable only if F < 0, that is, only if  < FOb .
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On the other hand the full agglomeration equilibrium is stable for  > s.
Importantly, s < b so there are parameters values such that both types of
equilibria are stable and coexists.
Assume now the existence of relative concerns,  > 0. Figure 1:a and
Figure 1:b represents the function F for  = 0:02, 0:04, 0:06, 0:08. They show
that with relative concerns, as  rises the symmetric equilibrium becomes
stable as soon as  > d where d is the dispersion point. Hence, the
symmetric equilibrium is stable both for small values of the freeness of trade
; such that  < b, and for high levels of integration, such that  is above
16The values of the other parameters for which curves in Figure 1:a b are drawn (equal
to those used to derive Figures II:a  b, III:a  b and V:a  b in the Appendix) are given
by: L = 20, H = 10,  = 2,  = 0:4 in Figure 1:a and  = 0:11 in Figure 1:b.
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the new critical level d.
Consider now the equilibrium with full agglomeration. As  rises and
reaches the sustain point, s; full agglomeration becomes a stable equilibrium,
as in the case  = 0. However, this equilibrium again disappears after trade
costs have decreased beyond a new critical level, that we name unsustain
point, u. Table 1 show the values of s, b, u and d obtained numerically
for the model with L = 4, H = 10,  = 2 and  = 0:11.17
s b d u
 = 0 0:7167 < 0:7181 = =
 = 0:02 0:6347 < 0:6350 0:9891 < 0:9892
 = 0:04 0:5850 > 0:5845 0:9731 < 0:9736
 = 0:06 0:5504 > 0:5495 0:9589 < 0:9599
 = 0:08 0:5245 > 0:5235 0:9475 < 0:9489
 = 0:1 0:5043 > 0:5032 0:9386 < 0:9403
 = 0:12 0:4877 > 0:4867 0:9317 < 0:9338
 = 0:14 0:4739 > 0:4731 0:9265 < 0:9289
 = 0:16 0:4622 > 0:4616 0:9227 < 0:9254
Table 1: Critical points for di¤erent values of .
17The choice of a smaller value of L and  = 0:11 allows for the asymmetric stable
equilibria when  > 0:04.
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The analysis in Table 1 is summarized by the bifurcation diagrams re-
ported in Figure 2. In this gure the spatial equilibrium distribution of
workers and rms is drawn as a function of the freeness of trade ,  2 [0; 1],
and for three values of . The bold continuous lines represent stable equilib-
ria (as pointed out by the arrows), while the bold discontinuous lines repre-
sent unstable asymmetric equilibria. Specically: the rst diagram is drawn
for  = 0 and replicates the bifurcation diagram in Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003, p. 237); the second diagram is obtained with  = 0:02; the third
graphic shows how the bifurcation diagram appears for 0:04    0:16.
An important regularity for its implication, is that when  increases, all the
four critical points s; b; d and u decrease progressively. The bifurcation
diagrams therefore shifts on the left as  increases.
From the bifurcation diagrams and Table 1 we deduce the four main
properties that we summarize as follow.
Proposition 5 In the calibrated model with L = 4, H = 10,  = 2 and
 = 0:11 and in the case of the complete network we nd the following results.
1. For low trade costs, relative concerns tends to destabilize the full ag-
glomeration equilibrium and stabilize the symmetric equilibrium. For
medium and high trade costs, relative concerns tends to destabilize the
symmetric equilibrium and stabilize the agglomeration equilibrium.
2. More specically
(a) When  = 0, full agglomeration is stable for high levels of inte-
gration and the symmetric equilibrium is stable for low levels of
integration, as s < b: Both types of equilibrium are stable for
intermediate values of integration .
(b) When  = 0:02, we nd that s < b < d < u: Then the
symmetric equilibrium is stable for low and for high levels of inte-
gration . Full agglomeration is stable for intermediate values of
 while no stable partial agglomeration is a stable equilibrium.
(c) When   0:04, we nd that b < s < d < u: Then the
symmetric equilibrium is stable for low and for high levels of inte-
gration . Full agglomeration is stable for intermediate values of
 and stable partial agglomeration equilibria exist for  2 (b; s).
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Figure 2 also shows an interesting property: when   0:04, stable asym-
metric equilibria are possible and there exists a pitchfork pattern with a
continuous, and easily reversible, transition from symmetry to agglomera-
tion. This is not a traditional property either of the seminal core-periphery
model by Krugman (1991) or of the Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) footloose
entrepreneur model. Indeed, these models exhibit catastrophic agglomera-
tion and locational hysteresis with a tomahawk pattern, as can be seen from
the bifurcation diagram obtained with  = 0. In these models, once trade
freeness has increased beyond the break point, b, all the mobile manufac-
turing sector catastrophically fully agglomerates in one region. If then trade
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costs increase again, they do not restore the symmetric equilibrium until 
falls below the sustain point, s, which lies at a strictly lower level of trade
freeness than the break point b.
Proposition 6 For su¢ ciently large values of , as openness to trade in-
creases, stable asymmetric equilibria can appear and a pitchfork pattern can
emerge with a continuous, and easily reversible, transition from symmetry to
agglomeration.
The presence of the conspicuous good e¤ect seems responsible of a loca-
tion pattern which is new, and sometimes replaces, the original tomahawk
diagram identied by the literature on the core-periphery model (see for e.g.
Helpman (1998), Tabuchi (1998), Ludema and Wooton (1999), Ottaviano et
al. (2002), Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Murata (2003), Püger (2004), Nocco
(2009), Berliant and Kung (2009) and Püger and Suedekum (2010)).
We conclude with some intuition on the forces generating the above re-
sults. When trade costs are small, relative concerns tend to stabilize the
symmetric equilibrium while they tend to destabilize it when the cost is
intermediate. Indeed, the e¤ect of introducing relative concerns, which in-
crease the conspicuous demand for the di¤erentiated goods, are more lo-
calized when trade costs are high (low ), rising more sharply the interior
demand. This force, destabilize the symmetric equilibrium as it increases the
new centripetal market size e¤ect in Forslid and Ottaviano.18 On the con-
trary, when trade costs are low, the increase in the demand for di¤erentiated
goods spill over to the other region and the dispersion forces again dominate.
5 Asymmetric networks
So far we assumed that the comparison group was the entire population in
the region of residence. However, it might be argued that in the real world
only interactions within a smaller group occur. We will start by considering
that agents are sensitive to comparisons only within their own type group.
Other asymmetric cases will be considered in later sections, for example the
case of a directed network in which the unskilled workers compare their own
18We recall that in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) we have two centrifugal forces, that
is the market-size e¤ect and the cost-of-living e¤ect and one centrifugal force, that is the
market-crowding e¤ect. These forces are dened as the "traditional" or "original" forces.
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consumption with a subset of skilled workers but not the other way round.
At the end of the section, we will extend the analysis to a mixed case in which
agents choose between two regions, each with a di¤erent network. Finally
note that as in the previous section, we assume that agents compare their
consumption with the average consumption of the other agents in the relevant
neighbourhood weighted by the measure of the comparison group.
Figure 3 illustrates three types of networks we analyze. For these, we
consider both the full agglomeration equilibrium and the symmetric equilib-
rium in which agents are symmetrically dispersed across the two regions; the
orange and blue points represent, respectively, the skilled and the unskilled
workers. Note that the illustration is a nite version of the formal model,
which has a continuum of agents.
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5.1 The segregated network
We consider here the case in which skilled workers are a¤ected only by the
consumption of other skilled workers and unskilled workers only by that of
other unskilled workers. Formally, we let hHr = Hr, lLr = L, and hLr =
lHr = 0. We show in Appendix II (II.B) that we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 7 In the case of segregated networks, full agglomeration is
sustainable only for intermediate values of trade costs .
Moreover, in Appendix II (II.B) we show that for the symmetric equilib-
rium we can state what follows.
Proposition 8 Consider the calibrated model of Proposition 5. For segre-
gated networks when trade costs are small, positive values of  stabilize the
symmetric equilibrium. For intermediate values of economic integration
, relative concerns tend to destabilize the symmetric equilibrium when  is
relatively large while they tend to stabilize the symmetric equilibrium when 
is relatively small.
5.2 The multiple star network
Star congurations are very popular in sociology and network economics.
When agents are in discrete number, a star is a conguration in which an
agent, the center, is connected to some other agents, while these are not con-
nected among themselves. Extending the notion to a continuum of agents
posses some issues. The problem we face is simplied by the fact that in the
model we introduce relative concerns as a deviation from the average con-
sumption of the reference group, weighted by the size of the group. We con-
sider the conguration in which each unskilled worker is a¤ected by the av-
erage conspicuousconsumption of the skilled workers in his, or her, neigh-
bourhood. The generalization of the discrete star to the continuousstar is
performed assuming the size e¤ect is 1 for the e¤ect of the center (the un-
skilled) on the skilled workers, while it is Hr=L for the weight of the skilled
on the unskilled (as there are L stars with a populations of Hr unskilled).
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Formally, we let hLr = Hr=L, lHr = 1 and hHr = lLr = 0. In Appendix
II (II.C) we show what follows.
Proposition 9 In the case of the star networks with weak relative concerns,
full agglomeration is stable only for intermediate levels of openness to trade
.
Moreover, in Appendix II (II.C) we show that for the symmetric equilib-
rium the following holds.
Proposition 10 In the case of star networks, numerical analysis shows that
weak relative concerns stabilise the symmetric equilibrium for high levels
of openness to trade  while they destabilise the symmetric equilibrium for
low or intermediate levels of . These e¤ects are weak when  = 0:4 but
increase when  decreases.
5.3 Choosing between an integrated region and a fully
segregated region
We now consider the case in which skilled workers can choose between two
regions: one characterized by an integrated (complete) network and the other
region characterised by two segregated networks. Let r be the region with
an integrated network and v the region with two segregated networks, one
composed only of skilled workers and the other one composed only of un-
skilled workers. As previously, we focus our analysis on the case in which
relative concerns are additive and evaluate the spatial distribution of workers
for di¤erent levels of trade integration .
In Appendix II (II.D) we compute the log of the indirect utility levels in
the mixed case, noted V mix (Hr; ; ) from expression (63). Not surprisingly,
we nd that V mix (H=2; ; ) is di¤erent than 0 provided  > 0; so that the
symmetric conguration is not an equilibrium with relative concerns. Interior
equilibria with partial agglomeration may however exist.
The analysis focuses on the calibrated model with parameter values  =
0:08, L = 4, H = 10,  = 2 and  = 0:11, that is, the same used to derive
the bifurcation diagram for the complete network in Figure 2. We see from
Figure 4:a that for large shipping costs, there is an interior equilibrium, but
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this is not symmetric. As  rises, the population in the segregated region
v increases, until full agglomeration is reached, and becomes sustainable for
  0:3106.
The same analysis is performed with a higher value of the parameter 
proportional to the share of income net of the conspicuous e¤ect devoted to
acquire the di¤erentiated good, and a larger proportion of unskilled work-
ers.19 Figure 4:b has been drawn for  = 0:4 and L = 20 (satisfying the
condition H < 2L=(   1) derived in Appendix II (II.D)). The analysis
shows that for small ; as  rises, the population density in the integrated
region r increases. Full aggregation in this region is reached for a relatively
low value of : This bifurcation diagram shows that for intermediate values
of  full agglomeration in the segregated region is also a stable equilibrium.20
These di¤erent patterns of agglomeration can be explained by the di¤er-
ent values of relative endowments of skilled and unskilled workers and of .
19Specically, from (4), (9) and (10), we know that  =
pXr

Xir  S(
(r(i)))1+S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj

Wir
.
20If instead, we increase only one of the two parameters to the new value, and the other
remain equal to that used to draw Figure 4:a, we get a bifurcation diagram that resembles
that in Figure 4:a.
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Let us recall that the wage of unskilled is always 1, while the wages of skilled
in both regions can be either higher or lower than 1. Since in both cases
H = 10, when L = 20 and  = 0:4 (Figure 4:b), the endowment of unskilled
workers in both regions and the parameter  (proportional to the share of
expenditure in the di¤erentiated good) are su¢ ciently large to ensure that
skilled wages are su¢ ciently higher than that of unskilled. Thus, we can
observe that when the endowment of unskilled is relatively large (for a large
value of ), there is a strong tendency to have full agglomeration of skilled in
the integrated region as they prefer to compare their consumption level with
the average consumption of neighbours in the integrated region than with
that in the segregated region. This because average consumption of neigh-
bours tends to be smaller in the integrated region (where the consumption of
unskilled is considered and it is smaller than that of skilled) than the average
consumption of neighbours in the segregated region (where skilled compare
their consumption only with that of skilled). The opposite happens when
L = 4 and  = 0:11 (Figure 4:a).21
Proposition 11 In an economy in which skilled workers can choose between
migrating to an integrated or a segregated region when  = 0:08, L = 20, H =
10,  = 2 and  = 0:4, for very low  there exists an interior equilibrium
in which the integrated region has a higher density. For all other values of 
there exists full agglomeration in the integrated region. For intermediate
values of  there also exists an equilibrium with full agglomeration in the
segregated region.
In light of the above case, we conjecture that in general, when agents can
choose between migrating to regions with di¤erent networks of interpersonal
comparisons, there exists interval of values of trade costs such that there
exists an asymmetric interior equilibrium and intervals for which the full
agglomeration equilibrium exists and is stable.
21In this case, the relative endowment of unskilled is su¢ ciently small to ensure that
unskilled wages (equal to 1) are larger than skilled wages. Thus skilled tends to have
larger consumption in the segregated region where they do not have to compare their
consumption with that of unskilled, and thus we observe agglomeration in the segregated
region.
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5.4 Summary of the analysis: The role of the network
for di¤erent levels of economic integration
Table 3, column 1, summarizes our ndings for the additive specication for
the congurations we have considered so far (column 2 of the table considers
the average specication that will be presented in Section 6). The analysis
in this section has shown that also in the case of asymmetric networks, the
interplay of agglomeration and dispersion forces is a¤ected by the conspicuous
e¤ect. Furthermore, the resulting force is very sensitive to the topology of
the network of conspicuouslinks in each region, as well as to the level of
economic integration .
We have shown that the complete network and the star network exhibit
similar patterns for the e¤ects of conspicuous consumptions but with di¤erent
strength (see Figure 1, and Figures II and III in the Appendix). On the
other hand, the e¤ects di¤er in the case of the segregated network when ,
that is, the share of income devoted to di¤erentiated good consumption, is
large. Specically, we observe that:
1. With relative concerns, the symmetric equilibrium is stabilized for low
trade costs (large ) and this for all types of networks. With low trade
costs the direct centrifugal force due to relative concerns dominates
the other forces. The strength of the e¤ect produced by a given value
of  varies across the three networks, the weakest e¤ect being with
the star. Note that in the absence of relative concerns, the symmetric
equilibrium is never stable for high levels of :
2. For low and intermediate values of 
(a) In the complete and the star networks, the conspicuous consump-
tion e¤ect tends to destabilize the symmetric equilibrium. Indeed,
the rise in domestic demand generates a strong agglomeration
force that overpowers the others.
(b) In the segregated network, conspicuous consumption tends to desta-
bilize the symmetric equilibrium when  is relatively large. How-
ever, here the centrifugal force is large in the segregated network
because skilled workers only compare with other skilled workers
and the centripetal market size e¤ect is less important because the
unskilled are una¤ected by changes in the consumption of skilled
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in the region. Consequently, when the expenditures for conspicu-
ous consumption is low ( is relatively low), the resulting force is
centrifugal, stabilizing the symmetric equilibrium.
3. Not surprisingly, the masses H and L are both relevant for the stability
of equilibria in the case of the star and of the complete network, while
only H is relevant for the segregated network. Note that they are not
relevant in the model with no relative concerns of Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003).
4. When skilled workers can choose whether to migrate to a region with a
complete network or to a region with two segregated networks, for high
trade costs, there exists an asymmetric interior equilibrium, which can
be in one of the two regions depending on the parameters of the model,
and becomes full agglomeration once trade costs decrease to interme-
diate and low levels. When  and L are relatively large, the region
in which agglomeration takes place is that with a complete network,
even though, for an open interval of , there also exists a stable full
agglomeration equilibrium in the segregated region.
6 A di¤erent specication for the conspicu-
ous good e¤ect
6.1 The demand side with the pure average specica-
tion
In previous Sections the strength of the relative concern is a¤ected by the
size of the comparison group. In particular, as the number of neighbours
increases, the conspicuous good e¤ect also increases. However, in a popu-
lar specication the individuals only care about the deviations from their
consumption and from the average consumption of their neighbours. In this
Section we investigate how our previous results are modied when we assume
as in the literature that there is no size e¤ect, that is, S(
(r(i))) = 1 for
the expressions in Sections 2.1 and 3. Moreover, we use 0 instead of  to
distinguish the particular case under scrutiny in which the agent cares about
the average of his/her neighboursconsumption. Finally, the production side
is as in Section 2.2.
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It can be readily veried from expressions (10) and (11) that, for given
levels of the wage (wir), of the number of neighbours (r(i)) and of the value
of their total expenditure on the di¤erentiated good (Er(i)), the presence
of relative concerns tends to produce a larger value of the wage, net of the
conspicuous e¤ect, within the average specication than within the additive
specication. Nevertheless, we know from the expressions (8) that the de-
mand Xir for the di¤erentiated good is larger in the case of the additive
specication.22
The location decision of skilled workers is determined by the value of
the logarithm of the ratio of the current indirect utility levels in (24), which
becomes
V (Hr; ; 
0) = ln

pXv
pXr

W0Hr
W0Hv

(32)
when using S(
(r(i))) = 1 and where the price indexes pXr and pXv are
substituted from (19) and (20).
For any specic network, the individual demands of the di¤erentiated
good by the skilled workers and by the unskilled workers in region r, i.e.,
XHr and XLr , is obtained as described in Appendix III.
6.2 The complete network without group size e¤ects
We consider rst the case in which the reference group is the entire population
of the residents in region r. This assumption implies that hHr = hLr = Hr
and lHr = lLr = L. Appendix III (III.A) shows how to compute the wages
which are then substituted into (32) in order to evaluate the stability of the
symmetric and of the fully agglomerated equilibria.
The symmetric equilibrium, with all variables assuming the same value in
both regions, is one of the interior equilibria also in the case under scrutiny
without size e¤ects. In Appendix III.A we show that the following Proposi-
tion holds.
Proposition 12 With a complete network and no size e¤ect, the direct cen-
trifugal e¤ect of relative concerns is weaker than in the additive specication.
However, as in the additive case, when 0 is relatively low the symmetric
equilibrium is stable for high levels of . On the other hand, for su¢ ciently
22If
R
r(i)
dj = 1, then Wir = W0ir and, for given values of the other variables, the
demandXir for the di¤erentiated good is equal for both additive and average specications.
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large 0 the symmetric equilibrium is unstable for high levels of  as soon as
H > 2L(1+
0)


+[0( 1) 1] , while for smaller H the equilibrium is stable.
The comparison with the additive specication is interesting. With low
levels of 0, the symmetric equilibrium becomes stable for high levels of 
independently of the presence of group size e¤ects. Instead, for a relatively
high value of 0 the symmetric equilibrium is stable for high levels of  only
if the mass of skilled workers is not too large. The role of H in stability
is novel. It is related to the fact the size H matters in the strength of
the indirect e¤ects. With the additive specication considered earlier, the
centrifugal e¤ects produced with high values of  were su¢ ciently strong to
stabilize the symmetric equilibrium for any value of H.
Let us now turn to the case of full agglomeration in region r. In the nal
part of Appendix III.A we show that, in general, we can state what follows.
Proposition 13 With the complete network and no group size e¤ects, full
agglomeration is never stable for low levels of  and it is stable for intermedi-
ate levels of economic integration : For very low trade costs this equilibrium
might or might not be stable depending on the parameter values, while in the
economy with group size e¤ects it is never stable.
The general economic intuition is that in the economy with group size
e¤ects the centrifugal forces are stronger than in the present case..
6.3 The segregated network without group size e¤ects
We consider here the case in which the reference group is composed only of
workers of the same type and ignore group size e¤ects. In this specic case,
we let hHr = Hr, lLr = L and hLr = lHr = 0. In Appendix III (III.B) we
compute the wages that are then substituted into (32) to give V s (Hr; ; 0) :
Expression (73) allows to evaluate the stability of the symmetric and the
fully agglomerated equilibria. Taking into account what shown in Appendix
III (III.B), we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 14 In the case of the pure average specication with segregated
networks, increases in relative concerns favour agglomeration. Specically,
increases in 0 reduce the lower break point sb such that for  2 [0; sb)
the symmetric equilibrium is stable: relative concerns tend to destabilize this
equilibrium. The sustain point ss also decreases with 
0; extending therefore
the range of existence and stability of full agglomeration.
33
Note that in the case of an economy with group size e¤ects, for large val-
ues of , positive values of  stabilize the symmetric equilibrium, a property
that doesnt occur without size e¤ects. For intermediate values of economic
integration , relative concerns with size e¤ects tend to stabilize the symmet-
ric equilibrium when  is relatively small. Again this e¤ect is absent without
size e¤ects.
6.4 The multiple star network without group size ef-
fects
As in Section 5.2 we now assume that the unskilled agent compares his or
her consumption with the average consumption of the skilled workers and
that each skilled worker compares his or her consumption with the unskilled
worker (the center of the star). As in the present section we neglect size
e¤ects, the size of the reference group does not matter, as soon as it is not of
zero measure. Formally, the "star average" is characterized by hLr = Hr=L,
lHr = 1 and hHr = lLr = 0. In Appendix III (III.C) we compute the wages
that are then substituted into (32) to evaluate V s (Hr; ; 0) as given in (76).
The following Proposition summarises the ndings.
Proposition 15 In the case of the average specication with star networks,
direct computation shows that with relative concerns full agglomeration in a
region is never sustainable with low values of . Moreover, the numerical
analysis of the calibrated model shows that: (i) increases in 0 tend to desta-
bilize the symmetric equilibrium for low values of  (as they reduce the break
point sb) and have no e¤ect for high values of ; (ii) on the other hand, in-
creases in 0 tend to stabilize full agglomeration for high levels of  (as they
reduce the sustain point ss).
Hence, while with group size e¤ects we found that weak relative concerns
stabilize the symmetric equilibrium for high levels of openness to trade ,
we have also found that this e¤ect can vanish without size e¤ects. On the
other hand, relative concerns destabilize the symmetric equilibrium for low
or intermediate levels of  for both formulations, i.e., with or without group
size e¤ects.
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6.5 The role of the size of the reference group in mi-
gration decisions with relative concerns
In this paper we have explored the role of relative concerns in location deci-
sion and city dynamics, via two polar specications on how these concerns
enter the utility function. We summarize our ndings as follows.
1. For complete networks:
(a) for high values of  and with group size e¤ects, the symmetric
equilibrium is stabilized by relative concerns. This is due to the
strong centrifugal force of relative concern. Without size e¤ects
(average specication) this result holds when 0 is relatively low, or
provided that the mass of skilled workers is not too large when 0 is
relatively high. Otherwise, when 0 is relatively high and the mass
of skilled workers is relatively large, the symmetric equilibrium is
unstable even for  = 1: Indeed, in this case the centrifugal force
does not increase with H (as we assume no group size e¤ect) while
the centripetal market size e¤ect increases, leading to partial or
full agglomeration.
(b) for medium values of  relative concerns tend to destabilize the
symmetric equilibrium and stabilize full agglomeration. Indeed,
the rise in domestic demand generates a strong agglomeration
force that overpowers the other forces.
2. For segregated networks
(a) an increase in relative concerns stabilize the symmetric equilib-
rium for high ; provided there are group size e¤ects. Without
group size e¤ects the centrifugal force is weaker and there is full
agglomeration.
(b) for intermediate and low values of economic integration  the
symmetric equilibrium is destabilized for large  independently
of the size e¤ects due to the strong market size e¤ect. For small 
and with group size e¤ects the symmetric equilibrium is stabilized
by relative concerns because of strong centrifugal directs e¤ect of
relative concerns and weak centripetal indirect e¤ects of relative
concerns. Without group size e¤ects the symmetric equilibrium is
destabilized because the centrifugal direct e¤ects are weaker.
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3. For multiple star networks
(a) an increases in relative concerns stabilize the symmetric equilib-
rium for large values of  only with group size e¤ects while it has
no e¤ect without size e¤ects. Then relative concerns destroy the
full agglomeration at very high  only with size e¤ects.
(b) for intermediate values of , relative concerns destabilize the sym-
metric equilibrium and stabilize full agglomeration.
7 Conclusion
The goal of the paper was to explore the role of relative concerns in location
decision and city dynamics. In core-periphery models of economic geography,
full agglomeration is typically the outcome when trade costs vanish. We
have seen that relative concerns generates a powerful centrifugal force that
can stop this process. However, the notion of trade costs should not be
dened too narrowly and they merely represent a wide variety of obstacles to
economic integration. As a result, these trade costs are di¢ cult to evaluate
and the analysis of the present model should be extended to the case with
intermediate costs. Surprisingly, when trade costs are intermediate, relative
concerns also generate a new centripetal force favoring full agglomeration.
The driving force is the market size e¤ect, that is, a centripetal force produced
by the increase in per rm domestic demand of the conspicuous good, which
rises prots and wages. The direction of the resultant force is however highly
sensitive to the network structure.
In particular, for a given value of trade costs, relative concerns might
be such that full agglomeration emerges when agents in the city are fully
integrated while a stable symmetric equilibrium emerges when the cities are
segregated in homogeneous but separated areas. In general, it appears that
the centrifugal force of relative concern is stronger in segregated organisa-
tions. On the other extreme, this e¤ect is weaker in star congurations
where agents are only a¤ected by the behavior of the agents of the other
type.
An interesting pattern emerges when agents can choose between regions
with di¤erent organisations. Although for some costs, interior solutions may
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survive, there is a strong tendency to observe full agglomeration in the inte-
grated region, at least when the endowment of unskilled workers is relatively
large. Indeed, in this case skilled workers prefer to compare their consump-
tion level with the average consumption of neighbours in the integrated re-
gion because it is smaller than the average consumption of neighbours in the
segregated region. To sum up, for intermediate shipping costs and relative
concerns, workers tends to migrate to regions in which the di¤erent types of
agents a¤ect each others behavior.
The previous analysis has interesting policy implications. Indeed, the
planner can, by favoring one type of city organisation rather than another,
a¤ect the migration patterns and the type of agglomeration arising in equilib-
rium. Clearly, the optimal type of structure depends on the welfare function
of the planner. For example, if the welfare loss of shipping goods dominates,
full agglomeration appears as the goal to pursue and favoring integrated so-
cieties appear as to be a favorable factor. On the other hand, if full agglom-
eration is costly from a social point of view, for example due to congestion or
pollution, favoring segregated communities delivering interior solutions and
thus less dense cities, is optimal.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I.
I.A. Consumers demand for the two goods and indirect utility
In this part of the Appendix we compute the consumers demand for the
di¤erentiated good and for the agricultural good in region r and the indirect
utility function U(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i))).
Each individual i in region r solves the program
MaxAir;XirU(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i)))
s:t: Air + pXrXir = wir
with
 (Xir; X ir;r(i)) = Xir + S(
(r(i)))
"
Xir  
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj
#
;
As
R
r(i)
dj = 
(r(i)), the Lagrangean function is
L = A1 ir
"
Xir + S(
(r(i)))
 
Xir  
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
!#
+ (wir   Air   pXrXir)
with the rst order conditions respectively given by
(1  )A ir
"
Xir + S(
(r(i)))
 
Xir  
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
!#
   = 0; (33)
A1 ir
"
Xir + S(
(r(i)))
 
Xir  
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
!# 1
[1 + S(
(r(i)))] pXr = 0
(34)
and
wir   Air   pXrXir = 0 (35)
From (33) and (34) we get that
Air =
(1  ) pXr
h
Xir + S(
(r(i)))

Xir  
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
i
 [1 + S(
(r(i)))]
(36)
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which can be substituted into (35) to obtain the consumers demand for the
di¤erentiated good in region r
Xir =

pXr
 
wir + pXr
1  

S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
!
(37)
Previous expression can be substituted into (36) to obtain the consumers
demand for the agricultural good in region r, that is
Air = (1  )
 
wir   pXr
S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
!
(38)
Then, substituting (37) and (38) into
U(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i))) = A
1 
ir ( (Xir; X ir;r(i)))

we obtain the indirect utility function:
U(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i)))
=
(1  )1   (1 + S(
(r(i))))
(pXr)

 
wir   pXr
S(
(r(i)))
1 + S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
Xjrdj)

(r(i))
!
I.B. Individual demand in region r for variety s and the price
index pXr
In this second part of the Appendix we show that the individual demand
in region r for variety s is given by
Xir(s) =
pr(s)
 
p1 Xr
Eir (39)
and dene the price index pXr by
 R
s2N
(pr(s))
1  ds
 1
1 
.
Using the denition Xir 
 R
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
 
 1
, the problem faced by
consumer i in region r becomes
Max U(Air; (Xir; X ir;r(i))) = A
1 
ir
(
Xir + S(
(r(i)))
 
Xir  
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
!)
=
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= A1 ir f
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1 + S(
(r(i))) 264
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1   1

(r(i))
Z
r(i)
0@ Z
s2N
Xjr(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1 dj
375 g
s:t: Air +
Z
s2N
pr(s)Xir(s)ds = wir:
The lagrangean function is
L = A1 ir f
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1 + S(
(r(i)))
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0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1   1

(r(i))
Z
r(i)
0@ Z
s2N
Xjr(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1 dj
375 g +
+
0@wir   Air   Z
s2N
pr(s)Xir(s)ds
1A
The rst order condition (FOC) with respect to the consumption of variety
s, Xir(s), is:
A1 ir


 1 (x)

 1 1  1

Xir(s)
 1
  1+ 
 1S(
(r(i)))(x)

 1 1  1

Xir(s)
 1
  1


Xir+S(
(r(i)))

Xir 
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
1  = pr(s)
while that written with respect to the consumption of variety v, Xir(v), is:
A1 ir


 1 (x)

 1 1  1

Xir(v)
 1
  1+ 
 1S(
(r(i)))(x)

 1 1  1

Xir(v)
 1
  1


Xir+S(
(r(i)))

Xir 
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
1  = pr(v)
with x =
R
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds. Considering the ratio of the two previous FOC,
we obtain:
Xir(s)
  1

Xir(v)
  1

=
pr(s)
pr(v)
(40)
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Let us substitute  from (33) into the rst order condition with respect
to variety s, Xir(s), to get

Air
 R
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
! 
 1 1
Xir(s)
 1
  1
Xir+S(
(r(i)))

Xir 
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
 [1 + S(
(r(i)))] = (1  ) pr(s) (41)
Moreover, from (36) we know that
Air
Xir + S(
(r(i)))

Xir  
R
r(i)
Xjrdj

(r(i))
 = (1  ) pXr
 [1 + S(
(r(i)))]
(42)
which can be substituted into (41) to obtain
pXr
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A 1 1 Xir(s) 1  1 = pr(s) (43)
Then we can rewrite (43) as
pXr
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A 1 1 Xir(s) 1 = pr(s)Xir(s)
Integrating this expression with respect to variety s and using the fact that
the individual expenditure on manufactures in region r isEir =
R
s2N
pr(s)Xir(s)ds,
we obtain:
pXr
0@ Z
v2N
Xir(v)
 1
 dv
1A 1 1 Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds =
Z
s2N
pr(s)Xir(s)ds;
pXr
0@ Z
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
1A  1 = Eir
From the previous expression we nd that
R
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds =

Eir
pXr
 1

,
which can be substituted into (43) to obtain the individual demand in region
r for variety s
Xir(s) =
pr(s)
 
p1 Xr
Eir
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Let us notice that from (40) we obtain that
Xir(s) =

pr(v)
pr(s)

Xir(v)
which can be substituted into the denition Xir 
 R
s2N
Xir(s)
 1
 ds
 
 1
to
obtain
Xir(v) =
pr(v)
  R
s2N
(pr(s))
1  ds
 
 1
Xir
Finally, we derive the expression for the (minimum) expenditure of attaining
Xir by substituting the expression of Xir(v) found previously into Eir =R
v2N
pr(v)Xir(v)dv: We obtain
Eir =
0@ Z
s2N
(pr(s))
1  ds
1A 11  Xir
which, using the denition of price index pXr 
 R
s2N
(pr(s))
1  ds
 1
1 
, can
be rewritten as Eir = pXrXir:
I.C. Individual demand of the di¤erentiated good by skilled and
unskilled workers in region r.
In this section we show how we derive the individual demand by the
skilled and by the unskilled consumers in region r. As
R
r(i)
dj = 
(r(i)),
the demands for each skilled individual i in region r as given by (7) and (8)
can be rewritten as
AHr = (1  )
h
wHr   pXr S(
(Hr ))1+S(
(Hr ))
(hHrXHr+lHrXLr )

(Hr )
i
; (44)
XHr =

pXr
h
wHr + pXr
1 

S(
(Hr ))
1+S(
(Hr ))
(hHrXHr+lHrXLr )

(Hr )
i
;
while for each unskilled individual i in region r the demands are
ALr = (1  )
h
wLr   pXr S(
(Lr ))1+S(
(Lr ))
(hLrXHr+lLrXLr )

(Lr )
i
; (45)
XLr =

pXr
h
wLr + pXr
1 

S(
(Lr ))
1+S(
(Lr ))
(hLrXHr+lLrXLr )

(Lr )
i
:
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Considering the second equations in (44) and in (45), we obtain a system of
two equations in the two unknowns XHr and XLr given by(
XHr = wHr

pXr
+
(1 )S(
(Hr ))
1+S(
(Hr ))
(hHrXHr+lHrXLr )

(Hr )
XLr =

pXr
+
(1 )S(
(Lr ))
1+S(
(Lr ))
(hLrXHr+lLrXLr )

(Lr )
(46)
where we used the fact that wLr = 1 and where 
(Hr) = hHr+lHr , 
(Lr) =
hLr + lLr .
I.D. More on the local demand in the complete additive speci-
cation
In the text we have introduced the new direct centrifugal force created by
the introduction of conspicuous consumption and we have also discussed how
it reinforces the original market size e¤ect in the core-periphery model. For
the sake of completeness, in this Appendix we notice that when some skilled
workers move in a region, associated with the increase in the number of rms
producing in the region, there are also two more additional e¤ects produced
by conspicuous consumption that strengthen the traditional forces at work
in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). The rst one is produced by the subse-
quent reduction in the local price index that tends to further attract workers
because of the increase in their local real wage, and this shows that conspic-
uous consumption strengthens the traditional cost-of-living e¤ect. The other
is produced because the traditional centrifugal force generated by the market-
crowding e¤ect is sharpened by conspicuous consumption e¤ects. This is due
to the fact that when a skilled worker moves in a region this increases also
the number of rms producing in the same region, depressing the local price
index and inducing a fall in local demand per rm (or per worker, given
that the two are proportional), for given expenditures on manufactures (e.g.
when L+HrwHr in (29) is treated as given). Hence, because of the conspic-
uous good e¤ect, all other workers in the region decrease their demand given
that they observe a reduction in the demand of their neighbours. Lower de-
mand leads to lower operating prots for rms and, therefore, lower skilled
wages, strengthening the traditional centrifugal force. This latter result can
be shown as follows. The local demand per rm, in region r, is Xrr(s)Hr
f
. Den-
ing L + HrwHr = Er (where Er are the total expenditures in region r), we
46
know that:
Xrr(s)
Hr
f
=  ( 1)Er
(Hrf +
H Hr
f
)
(Hr+L)+1
Hr
f
(Hr+L)+1
Then, we can apply a logarithmic transformation and get that logXrr(s)Hr
f
=
= log ( (   1)Er)-log



Hr
f
+ H Hr
f


+log
(Hr+L)+1
Hr
f
(Hr+L)+1
. Hence, we can
write that the rate of change of Xrr(s)Hr
f
(with b: denoting the rate of change of
a variable) is:
\ 
Xrr(s)
Hr
f
!
= cEr   \ Hr
f
+
H  Hr
f


+
\0@ (Hr+L)+1Hrf
 (Hr + L) + 1
1A < 0
The rate of change is negative because for a given value of Er we know that
cEr = 0, while \ Hrf + H Hrf  > 0 and \
 (Hr+L)+1
Hr
f
(Hr+L)+1
!
< 0.
APPENDIX II. NETWORKS AND ADDITIVE SPECIFICA-
TION
In the case of the additive specication, we know that S(
(r(i))) =

(r(i)). Hence, with 
(Hr) = hHr + lHr and 
(Lr) = hLr + lLr , the
system in (46) becomes(
1+(hHr+lHr ) (1 )hHr
1+(hHr+lHr )
XHr = wHr

pXr
+ (1 )
1+(hHr+lHr )
lHrXLr
1+(hLr+lLr ) (1 )lLr
1+(hLr+lLr )
XLr =

pXr
+ (1 )
1+(hLr+lLr )
hLrXHr
(47)
This system is solved to obtain the individual demands of the di¤erentiated
good by the skilled workers and by the unskilled workers in region r, i.e.,
XHr and XLr .
II.A. Complete network
Let us now consider the complete network and derive the expression for
skilled wages as a function of Hr. Substituting Xrr(s) and Xrv(s) from (29)
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and (30) into (22) and making use of (14), the wage paid to skilled workers
in region r must satisfy the following equation
wHr =


h
(L+HrwHr )
Hr+(H Hr)
1+r
1+r
+ 
(L+HvwHv )
(H Hr)+Hr
1+v
1+v
i
(48)
and an analogous expression holds for wHv . Hence, we get a system of two
linear equations in wHr and wHv that can be solved to obtain the two regional
wages for skilled workers as an explicit function of a given distribution of
workers, Hr and Hv, between the two regions, and we nd that the wage
paid in region r to skilled workers is
wHr = L
A(Hv+Hr)+B(Hr+Hv)+HvBA( 1)(+1)
2(H2r+H
2
v ) (AH2r+BH2v ) HvHr[(A+B) 2(2+1)+2BA( 1)(+1)]
(49)
where A = r+1
r+1
and B = v+1
v+1
.23 This expression shows that the wage
depends on the value of , and A and B represent a measure of the e¤ects
produced by the proximity of neighbors, respectively, in r (where the number
of neighbours is given by r = Hr + L) and in v (where the number of
neighbours is given by v = Hv + L).
The wage of skilled workers in (49) evaluated in the case in which they
are evenly distributed in the two regions is given by the following expression
wH=2 =
2L
H
s+1
 +s( 1)
where s  (H=2 + L) is the number of neighbours in each region at the
symmetric equilibrium.24 It can be readily shown that the wage (wHr) in-
creases in the symmetric equilibrium with . Finally, evaluating the wage of
skilled workers in (49) when they are all in region r we get that
wHr =
L
H
2+(H+2L)(+1)+22L(H+L)
(L+1)[ +(H+L)( 1)]
In what follows we show that Proposition 3 in Section 4.2 holds for the
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider the derivative of V (Hr; ; ) at the sym-
metric equilibrium. It can be shown using the expressions for skilled wages
23An analogous expression to (49) holds for wHv .
24Specically, we observe that A (Hr = Hv = H=2)=B (Hr = Hv = H=2)= s+1s+1 .
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derived for the symmetric equilibrium in this Appendix that
VHr (H=2; ; ) =
4(f22+f1+f0)
H(+1)( 1)[(H+2L)+2]f2+[2L H( 1)]g  (50)
1
f2[ +(+)]+(H+2L)[ 1+(+1)]g
where the coe¢ cients f0, f1 and f2 are functions of , , L, H and .
We know that all factors in the denominator are positive, given that  >
1 >  and that the term f2 +  [2L H(   1)]g is positive when WHr
evaluated at Hr = H=2 is positive.25 Thus, the sign of VHr (H=2; ; )
depends on the sign of the expression F  f22 + f1 + f0 in the nu-
merator, and the symmetric equilibrium is stable when F < 0 and un-
stable when F > 0. However, we know that when  = 0, F = a0 =
8(1   )(2       + 2 + 2   2 +    2 + 2   ). In this
case, a0 is the relevant term in determining the sign of VHr (H=2; ; ) ; and,
as in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), the symmetry breaking point FOb =
( 1 )( )
(+)(+ 1) < 1 is such that the symmetric equilibrium is stable only for
 2 (0; FOb ).26 Note that for  = 1, F = a0 = 0: As  becomes positive
and rises, F becomes negative, that is F = 4H2(   1)(1   )(2L +
H) f [H (   1)  2L]  2g < 0,27 and the symmetric equilibrium remains
stable for  = 1: By continuity the result holds for high levels of integration,
i.e., large . QED
We now focus our attention on equilibria in which all skilled workers move
to one region. Note that, provided these full agglomeration equilibria exist,
they are stable, and in what follows we show that Proposition 4 in Section
4.2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 4 The value of V (Hr; ; ) when all skilled workers
are located in region r is given by
V (H;; ) = ln

g0f2+[2L H( 1)]g1 

 1
d2
2+d1+d0

(51)
25This requires that the relative mass of skilled workers with respect to the mass of
unskilled is not relatively too high, that is, H < 2 (1+L)( 1) .
26We assume that the no black hole condition, that is  <    1, holds. This condition
rules out the case in which the symmetric equilibrium is never stable.
27We recall that we assume H < 2 (1+L)( 1) to have WHr (H=2) > 0.
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where
g0 =  (1 + L)
h
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
> 1
d2 = [1 +  (H + L)][L ( + 1) +  + ] > 0;
d1 =  H [ (H + L) (   1) +    ] < 0;
d0 = (1 + L) [ (H + L) (   1) +    ] > 0
When  = 0, expression (51) becomes
V (H;) = ln

2
1+

1 
(1+2) (1 2)

(52)
Equation (52) generates the sustain point s, i.e., the value of  such that
full agglomeration is stable for  > s; as in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
28
When  is positive, we know that g0 > 1 and that expression 
1+ 
1  is
increasing in  2 [0; 1] from 0 (if  = 0) to 1 (if  = 1).29 Given the sign of
the parameters d2, d1 and d0, expression d2
2 + d1+ d0 in the denominator
of (51) is an upward opening parabola in  with positive value d0 when
 = 0.30 Moreover, we know that, when workers are all agglomerated in
r, expression f2 +  [2L H(   1)]g in the numerator must be positive to
have WHr > 0.
31 Finally, the parabola in the denominator must be positive
in order to have WHv > 0. Figure I presents the three possible scenarios
for this parabola. In Figure I the numerator is represented by the dotted
line, which characterizes an increasing function in  taking the value 0 when
28See expression (25) at page 236 in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
29We recall that we assume the no black hole condition corresponding to the case of
 = 0 holds, that is  <    1.
30Moreover, its minimum value is attained at  =   d12d2 > 0 when  > 0 (and at  = 0
when  = 0), so that the parabola has a negative slope in  = 0 only if  is positive.
31This requires that H < 2 (1+L)( 1) .
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 = 0 and g0 f2 +  [2L H(   1)]g > 0 when  = 1.
phi
Figure I
The higher parabola obtained for large values of  corresponds to the
case in which full agglomeration is never stable. The lower parabola can be
excluded as it implies that with  = 1 the full agglomeration equilibrium is
stable, which contradicts direct computation.32 The only relevant case is then
the middleparabola. In this case, full agglomeration is stable only for in-
termediate values of  (when the second higher parabola lies below the dotted
32Indeed, we know that when  = 1 the denominator is
d2
2 + d1+ d0 =  (H+ L+ 1) (H+ 2L H + 2)
while the numerator is
g0 f2 +  [2L H(   1)]g1 

 1 =  (1 + L)
h
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
f2 +  [2L H(   1)]g
Hence when  = 1, the argument of the logarithm in (51) is given byh
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
(1+L)
(H+L+1) , which is equal to 1 when  = 0. With a positive value of
, we can show that
h
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
(1+L)
(H+L+1) < 1 and, thus, agglomeration is never an
equilibrium when  = 1.
Proof.
h
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
(1+L)
(H+L+1) < 1 requires that
h
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
< H+L+11+L . We
know that these two expressions, dened respectively as LHS =
h
(H+L)+1
L+1
i
and RHS =
H+L+1
1+L , are both equal to 1 when  = 0, and that they both increase in the range
 2 [0; 1] and assume the same value (H+L)+1(1+L) when  = 1. However, since 8 2 (0; 1)
the @
2LHS
@2 > 0 and
@2RHS
@2 < 0, the LHS is convex in  and the RHS is concave in ,
which implies that LHS < RHS. Q.E.D.
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curve). QED
II.B. Segregated network
In the case of the segregated network the system in (47) becomes(
1+Hr (1 )Hr
1+Hr
XHr = wHr

pXr
1+L (1 )L
1+L
XLr =

pXr
(53)
which can be solved for XHr and XLr to nd respectively that
XHr = 
wHr
pXr
1 + Hr
1 + Hr
and (54)
XLr = 
1
pXr
1 + L
1 + L
.
Making use of these solutions, we can rewrite the total demand in region r
for variety s produced in region k in (13) as follows
Xkr(s) = 
pkr(s)
 
p1 Xr

wHr
1+Hr
1+Hr
Hr +
1+L
1+L
L

(55)
where the price indices and the prices are respectively given by (19), (20),
(16) and (17). Making use of (55), the wage in (22) can be rewritten as
follows
wHr =


h
(ArwHr+AL)
Hr+(H Hr) +
(AvwHv+AL)
(H Hr)+Hr
i
where Ar  1+Hr1+HrHr, Av 
1+(H Hr)
1+(H Hr) (H  Hr) and AL  1+L1+LL. Pre-
vious expression can be considered together with the analogous expression
obtained for wHv to get a system of two equations in two unknowns wHr and
wHv , that can be solved to nd the two skilled regional wages given by
wHr =
AL[2Hr+Hv(1+2) Av(1 )(+1)]
Ds
(56)
and
wHv =
AL[2Hv+Hr(2+1) Ar(1 )(+1)]
Ds
(57)
with the denominator of both wages given byDs  2 (Hv + Hr) (Hr + Hv)
  Ar (Hv + Hr)  Av (Hr + Hv) + 2 (1  ) (1 + )ArAv.
Then, Wir in (9) can be written for skilled workers in region r as
WHr =
wHr
1 + Hr
,
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while for unskilled it is given by
WLr =
1
1 + L
Hence, we can rewrite (26) as follows
V (Hr; ; ) = ln
(h
(H Hr)+Hr
Hr+(H Hr)
i 
1 
h
1+Hr
1+(H Hr)
i wHr
1+Hr
wHv
1+(H Hr)
)
(58)
where the two regional wages for skilled workers wHr and wHv can be substi-
tuted from (56) and (57).
We rst focus on the equilibrium with full agglomeration and we show
that Proposition 7 in Section 5.1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 7 Expression (58) evaluated when all skilled workers
are located in region r (i.e. Hr = H and Hv = 0) is
V s(H;; ) = ln

2(1+H)
1+

1 
H[ 1+2(+1)]+[ +2(+)]

The value of V s(H;; ) in this case does not depend on L. On the one
hand, when  ! 0 (that is, in autarky), V s (H; 0; ) !  1 and full
agglomeration is not sustainable. On the other hand, with complete in-
tegration,  = 1, we nd that V s (H;; ) = ln (1+H)

(1+H)
, which is neg-
ative, provided  > 0; because
@

(1+H)
(1+H)

@
=  H2 (1 )
H+1
(H+1)
(H+1)2
< 0.
QED
We now consider the symmetric equilibrium and we show that we can
state Proposition 8 in Section 5.1.
Proof of Proposition 8 The derivative of V (Hr; ; ) in (58) with respect
to Hr evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium is given by the expression
V sHr (H=2; ; ) =
4(k22+k1+k0)
H(1+)( 1)(2+H)(h1+h0)
where the coe¢ cients k2, k1, k0, h1 and h0 are functions of , , H and 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and they do not depend on L.33 As the denominator of V sHr (H=2; ; ) is
positive, the sign of V sHr (H=2; ; ) depends on that of the parabola G 
k2
2 + k1 + k0, with the symmetric equilibrium stable (vs unstable) only
when G is negative (vs positive). We focus our analysis on the calibrated
model with H = 10 and  = 2: Figure II:a (on the left) represents the value
ofG as a function of  in the case of  = 0 (black curve),  = 0:02 (red curve),
 = 0:04 (blue curve),  = 0:06 (green curve) and  = 0:08 (yellow curve)
when  = 0:4: Figure II:b (on the right) represents G for the same values
except that now  = 0:11, where  is proportional to the share of income, net
of the conspicuous e¤ect, devoted to acquire the di¤erentiated good.34 The
numerical analysis shows that, the introduction of weak relative concerns
tends to stabilize the symmetric equilibrium for high levels of integration :
Stability always holds for  = 1 as then G = 42H2(   1)(   1) < 0.
The size of the interval of  on which stability holds is increasing in  and
decreasing with : Figure II:a also shows that for intermediate levels of
integration  the symmetric equilibrium is destabilized when when  is large.
Indeed, in this case the agglomerative e¤ect they produce is stronger than
the dispersion e¤ect. On the other hand, Figure II:b shows that when 
is relatively low the symmetric equilibrium can be stabilized for low and
intermediate values of economic integration  provided  is su¢ ciently large.
QED
33Specically,
k2 = 
2H2 ( + 1) [ (  2) + 2 (1  )]  2H [ ( +   1) + 3 ( +   1)]
 4 ( +   1) ( + ) ;
k1 = 2
2H22 [ (   1) + 1] + 4H  (1 + ) (   1) + 22+ 8  (   1) + 2 > 0;
k0 = 
2H2 (   1) [  2 (   1)]  2H  (+ 3) + 2 (+ 1)   (5+ 1)
 4 (     1) (   ) ;
h1 = 2 ( + ) +  ( + 1)H > 0;
h0 = 2 (   ) +  (   1)H > 0:
34Specically, from (4), (9) and (10), we know that  =
pXr

Xir  S(
(r(i)))1+S(
(r(i)))
R
r(i)
XjrdjR
r(i)
dj

Wir
.
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II.C. Star network
In the case of the star the system in (47) becomes(
XHr = wHr

pXr
+ (1 )
1+
XLr
XLr =

pXr
+ (1 )
1+Hr=L
XHrHr=L
which can be solved to nd XHr and XLr , whose values are respectively given
by
XHr =

pXr
(L+ Hr)
(1 )+wHr (1+)
L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )
and
XLr =

pXr
( + 1)
L+Hr+HrwHr (1 )
L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )
Making use of these solutions, we can rewrite expression (13) in the text as
follows
Xkr(s) = 
pkr(s)
 f[(1 )+wHr (1+)](L+Hr)Hr+(+1)[L+Hr+HrwHr (1 )]Lg
p1 Xr [L+(L+Hr)+Hr
2(2 )]
(59)
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with the price indices given by (19) and (20), and the prices given by (16)
and (17). Expression (59) is then used to rewrite the wage in (22) as follows
wHr =


(ar + brwHr + av + bvwHv)
where
ar =
(L+Hr)(L+L+Hr Hr)
[Hr+(H Hr)][L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )] ;
av =
[L+(H Hr)][L+L+(H Hr) (H Hr)]
(H Hr+Hr)fL+[L+(H Hr)]+(H Hr)2(2 )g ;
br =
(L+L L+Hr)(+1)Hr
[Hr+(H Hr)][L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )] and
bv =
(L+L L+(H Hr))(H Hr)(+1)
(H Hr+Hr)fL+[L+(H Hr)]+(H Hr)2(2 )g :
Writing an analogous expression for wHv , we can solve the system of two
equations in two unknowns wHr and wHv , to nd that:
wHr =
2arbv av ar 22arbv
br+bv 2 2brbv+22brbv (60)
and
wHv =
2brav ar av 22brav
br+bv 2 2brbv+22brbv (61)
Hence, in the specic case of the star, Wir in (9) can be written for
skilled and unskilled workers in region r, respectively, as
WHr = wHr    L+Hr+HrwHr (1 )L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )
and
WLr = 1  Hr (1 )+wHr (1+)L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )
The above expression for WHr is used to evaluate V (Hr; ; ) in (26) in the
specic case of the star to obtain the following expression
V  (Hr; ; ) = ln
(h
(H Hr)+Hr
Hr+(H Hr)
i 
1 

wHr 
L+Hr+HrwHr
(1 )
L+(L+Hr)+Hr2(2 )


wHv 
L+(H Hr)+(H Hr)wHv (1 )
L+(L+H Hr)+(H Hr)2(2 )

)
(62)
where the two regional wages for skilled workers, wHr and wHv , are given by
the expressions (60) and (61).
Let us consider the full agglomeration equilibrium in which all skilled
workers are located in one region, say region r, and we can show that Propo-
sition 9 in Section 5.2 holds.
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Proof of Proposition 9 Evaluating V  (Hr; ; ) in (62) when all skilled
are located in region r we obtain the following expression
V (H;; ) = ln
(
H2(1+)
n
 [( 1)+ LH (+1)]2+ LH [2 LH+(3 )]+2( LH )
2
o

1   1
z2
2+z1+z0
)
where the coe¢ cients z0, z1 and z2 are functions of , , L, H and , and the
denominator is a parabola open above (given that z2 > 035). The qualitative
analysis can be performed using Figure I in Appendix II.A. As in the case
of a complete network analyzed in Section 4.2, for su¢ ciently low values of
; the numerator in the argument of the logarithm is positive and, as we
assume thatWHr andWHv are positive, the denominator is also positive.
36
Furthermore, the numerator can be represented by an increasing function
in  which takes value 0 when  = 0 and is represented by the dotted
curve in Figure I. The denominator is represented by the three continuous
curves, of which the higher parabola can be excluded, as it implies that full
agglomeration is never stable, which contradicts direct computation. For
small values of  two scenario are possible: 1) either full agglomeration is
stable for intermediate values of ; this happens when the second higher
parabola is below the dotted curve; or 2) full agglomeration is stable for
high levels of economic integration , when the lowest parabola is below
the dotted curve.37 We exclude case 2) as it contradicts numerical analysis.
QED
We focus now on the symmetric equilibrium and we show that we can
state Proposition 10 in Section 5.2.
35Indeed,
z2 =

H2 (1  ) +HL (+ ) + L2 (1  )2+
+

L2 + L (2  ) (H + L) +HL+  L2 + L2 > 0
z1 =   z0HL(1+)
z0 = L (1 + ) [
 
L2   L H+ 2H H22 +
+
 
H  H+ L   2L+ L2+ (L   L)]
36More precisely, Figure I can be applied in the case in which z0 > 0 (which is true for
su¢ ciently low values of ), with the numerator represented by the dotted curve and the
denominator by one of the parabola.
37The minimum value of the parabola in the denominator is attained at  =   z12z2 =
z0H
2z2L(1+)
> 0 if z0 > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 10 . The derivative of V  (Hr; ; ) in (62) with
respect to Hr evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium is
V Hr (H=2; ; ) =
4(n22+n1+n0)
H(+1)( 1)(H+2L)[H( 1) 2L(+1)](d1+d0)
where the coe¢ cients n2, n1, n0, d1 and d

0 are all functions of , , H, 
and L.
To obtain insightful result we focus our analysis on the calibrated model
with H = 10,  = 2, and L = 20:
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Figure III:a shows the value of V Hr (H=2; ; ) as a function of  in the
case of  = 0 (black curve),  = 0:02 (red curve),  = 0:04 (blue curve),
 = 0:06 (green curve) and  = 0:08 (yellow curve) when  = 0:4. Fig-
ure III:b represents V Hr for the same values but with  = 0:11. The
numerical analysis shows that for high values of economic integration ;
the introduction of weak relative concerns stabilizes the symmetric equilib-
rium. On the other hand, for low values of  the e¤ect destabilizes the
symmetric equilibrium. This behavior is qualitatively similar to the one
observed in the complete network. However, the size of the e¤ect is very
weak for  = 0:4, much weaker than in the case of a complete network.
QED
II.D. The mixed case
Let us consider the case of the additive specication. Then when region
r has a complete (integrated) network, we know that the aggregate demand
in r of variety s produced in r, Xrr(s), is given by (29), while the aggregate
demand in r of variety s produced in v can be obtained from (30) and it is
given by
Xvr(s) = 
(   1)  
 (nr + nv)
(L+HrwHr) (L + Hr + 1)
1 +  (L+Hr)
On the other hand, given that region v has two segregated networks, we know
that the aggregate demands in v of variety s produced respectively in v and
in r can be obtained from (55). Hence, the wage in (22) in region r in the
mixed case can be rewritten as follows
wHr =


h
(L+HrwHr )
(Hr+Hv)
A+ 
(wHvAv+AL)
(Hv+Hr)
i
while that obtained in region v is given by
wHv =


h
(wHvAv+AL)
(Hv+Hr)
+
(L+HrwHr )
(Hr+Hv)
A
i
We use these last two equations to nd the wages of skilled workers in the
two regions, which are respectively
wHr = 
2ALHv ALAv+ALHv+ALHr+AL2Av+ALHr
2HrHv+2H2r+
2H2v+A
2AvHr+2
2HrHv AvHr AvHv AH2r A22AvHr AHrHv
and
wHv = 
ALHr AALHr+ALHv+AL2Hr+A2ALHr+ALHv
2HrHv+2H2r+
2H2v+A
2AvHr+2
2HrHv AvHr AvHv AH2r A22AvHr AHrHv
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where the two denominators in the two equations are equal.
Then, we nd that withWHr for skilled workers in the integrated region
r given by
WHr  wHr    L+HrwHrL+Hr+1
and WHv for skilled workers in the segregated region v
WHv =
wHv
Hv+1
,
the log of the indirect utility levels V (Hr; ; ) in the mixed case is given by
V mix (Hr; ; ) = ln

pXv
pXr
 
1+(L+Hr)
1+Hv
 wHr  L+HrwHrL+Hr+1
wHv
Hv+1

(63)
Evaluating V mix (Hr; ; ) in (63) when all skilled workers are located in
the integrated region r we obtain the following expression38
V mix (H;; ) = ln (1+L)f2+[2L H( 1)]g[(H+L)+1]

1   1
f[L(+1)++][1+(H+L)]g2+(L+1)[( 1)(H+L)+ ]
From the inspection of V mix (H;; ) we know that agglomeration in r can
be stable only for high or intermediate . When  = 1, the argument of
the logarithm in V mix (H; 1; ) is equal to 1 when  = 0. With a positive
value of , we can show that the argument of the logarithm in V mix (H; 1; )
is smaller than 1 and, thus, agglomeration is an equilibrium when  = 1,
only for relatively large value of  provided that the number of unskilled
workers is relatively large with respect to that of skilled workers, that is
H < 2L=(   1).39 More generally, we know that in this last case full
agglomeration is stable in r also for all values of  2 (s; 1).
38Where 2 +  [2L H(   1)] in the numerator has to be positive to have a positive
value of WHr when Hr = H. All the other factors in the numerator and denominator
are positive.
39Proof. The argument of the logarithm in V mix (H; 1; ) is smaller than 1 if
[H+2L+2+(H+2L+2L2+2HL)]
(1+L)f2+[2L H( 1)]g < [(H + L) + 1]
. We know that these two expres-
sions, dened as LHS = [
H+2L+2+(H+2L+2L2+2HL)]
(1+L)f2+[2L H( 1)]g and RHS = [(H + L) + 1]
,
are respectively equal to H+2L+2H+2L H+2 > 1 and to 1 when  = 0, and that they both
increase in the range  2 [0; 1] and assume respectively the value 2 H+L+1H+2L H+2 and
H + L + 1 when  = 1. If H > 2L=(   1) we nd always that LHS > RHS for
 2 [0; 1] and therefore full agglomeration in r with  = 1 is never an equilibrium. How-
ever, if H < 2L=(   1) full agglomeration in r with  = 1 is an equilibrium for relatively
large value of  that ensure that LHS < RHS. Q.E.D.
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Instead, evaluating V mix (Hr; ; ) in (63) when all skilled workers are
located in the segregated region v, we nd that
V mix (0; ; ) = ln
f(L+1)[H(+1)++]2 H[( 1)H+ ]+(L+1)[H( 1)+ ]g
2(L+1)1 (H+1)1 

 1
From the inspection of V mix (0; ; ) we know that agglomeration in r can
be stable only for high or intermediate . When  = 1, the argument of the
logarithm in V mix (0; 1; ) is equal to 1 when  = 0.
APPENDIX III. THE AVERAGE SPECIFICATION
In the case of the average specication, we know that S(
(r(i))) = 1.
Hence, with 
(Hr) = hHr + lHr and 
(Lr) = hLr + lLr , the system in (46)
becomes 8<: XHr =

pXr
h
wHr +
(1 )

pXr
0
(1+0)
(hHrXHr+lHrXLr )
hHr+lHr
i
XLr =

pXr
h
1 + (1 )

pXr
0
(1+0)
(hLrXHr+lLrXLr )
hLr+lLr
i (64)
This system is solved to obtain the individual demands of the di¤erentiated
good by the skilled workers and by the unskilled workers in region r, i.e.,
XHr and XLr .
III.A. Complete network
In the case of the complete network hHr = hLr = Hr and lHr = lLr = L,
and the system in (64) obtained with the additive specication can be solved
to nd the individual demand of the di¤erentiated good by a skilled consumer
in region r
XHr =

pXr
f(1 )0L+wHr [L+Hr+0(Hr+L)]g
(L+Hr)(1+0) (65)
and that by an unskilled consumer in the same region
XLr =

pXr
[(1 )0HrwHr+L+Hr+0(L+Hr)]
(L+Hr)(1+0) (66)
Substituting (65) and (66) into (13) we nd that
Xrr(s) = 
( 1)(L+HrwHr )
(nr+nv)
0+1
0+1 (67)
and
Xrv(s) = 
( 1) (L+HvwHv )
(nv+nr)
0+1
0+1 (68)
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Hence, substituting Xrr(s) and Xrv(s) from (67) and (68) into (22) and
making use of (14), we nd that the wage paid to skilled workers in region r
must satisfy the following equation
wHr =
(L+HrwHr)
(Hr+Hv)
+
(L+HvwHv)
(Hv+Hr)

 
0+1
0+1
An analogous expression holds for wHv . Therefore, also in this case we get a
system of two linear equations in wHr and wHv that can be solved to obtain
the two regional wages for skilled workers as an explicit function of a given
distribution of workers, Hr and Hv, between the two regions. Specically,
the wage paid in region r to skilled workers is
wHr = L
0+1
 +0( 1)
Hv[(2+1)(0+1)+( 1)(+1)(0+1)]+2Hr(0+1)
HvHr[(2+1)(0+1)+( 1)(+1)(0+1)]+(H2r+H2v )(0+1)
(69)
Making use of (65) and (66), we can substitute the total amount of con-
sumptions by the neighbours of skilled workers
R
Hr
Xjrdj = XHrHr +XLrL
in the denition of W0Hr and, thus, rewrite the wage of skilled workers net
of the conspicuous e¤ect in this case as follows40
W0Hr = wHr    00+1 L+HrwHrL+Hr =
wHr (L+Hr)+L
0(wHr 1)
(0+1)(L+Hr)
Finally, we can get an analogous expression to the previous one for the
wage of unskilled workers net of the conspicuous e¤ect. Specically, we can
substitute the total amount of consumptions by the neighbours of unskilled
workers
R
Lr
Xjrdj = XHrHr +XLrL in the denition of W0Lr from (9) and
obtain that41
W0Lr = 1   00+1 L+HrwHrL+Hr =
L+Hr+Hr0(1 wHr )
(0+1)(L+Hr)
The symmetric equilibrium, with all variables assuming the same value
in both regions, is one of the interior equilibria also in the case under scrutiny
without size e¤ects. To be stable it is required that the derivative of V (Hr; ; 0)
40This expression is relevant to check the positivity of agricultural demand by skilled
workers.
41This expression is relevant to check the positivity of agricultural demand by unskilled
workers.
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with respect toHr evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, that is VHr (H=2; ; 
0),
is negative. We show that
VHr (H=2; ; 
0) = f
0
2
2+f 01+f
0
0
H(+1)( 1)(H+2L)fH+2L 0[H( 1) 2L]g  (70)
1
f[ +(+)]+0[ 1+(+1)]g
where the parameters f 00, f
0
1 and f
0
2 are functions of , , L, H and 
0. All the
factors in the denominator are positive.42 Thus, the sign of VHr (H=2; ; 
0)
depends on that of the expression F 0  f 022 + f 01 + f 00, and the symmetric
equilibrium is stable when F 0 < 0, or unstable when the opposite sign holds.
The analysis is then similar to that conducted in Section 4.3 for the additive
specication.
If  = 0 and  = 1 then F 0 = a0 = 0. If  = 1 but  is positive, F 0 =
16H(   1)0[H    (H + 2L+H0 + 2L0  H0)]. If 0 < 1= (   1)
then F 0 is negative and the symmetric equilibrium is stable for any value
of H.43 If 0 > 1= (   1), F 0 is negative and the symmetric equilibrium is
stable for  = 1 only if H < 2L(1+
0)


+[0( 1) 1] .
44 This proves the rst Proposition
(that on the symmetric equilibrium) in Section 6.2.
Moreover, in the case of full agglomeration in region r, the value of
V (Hr; ; 
0) when all skilled workers are located in region r can be writ-
ten as follows:
V (H;; 0) = ln
(

1   1 L
(L+H) [l2(
0)2+l10+l0]
t2
2+t1+t0
)
(71)
where the coe¢ cients l2 = (H + 2L H), l1 = 2H + 2L+H + 2L H
42Specically, we know that H + 2L  0 [H (   1)  2L]=
[1  0 (   1)]H+2L(1+0) > 0 to have a positive value ofW0Hr when Hr = H=2. If
0 < 1= (   1) this requires that H > 2L(1+
0)
[1 0( 1)] . Instead, if 
0 > 1= (   1) this requires
that H <
2L(1+0)
[0( 1) 1]
43Indeed, if 0 < 1= (   1), F 0 is negative only if


 + [
0 (   1)  1]

H <
2L (1 + 0). Since we know that  +[
0 (   1)  1] < 0 if  < [1 0( 1)] (which is always
true since  < 1 and [1 0( 1)] > 1) F
0 is negative only if H >   2L(1+
0)
( +[1 0( 1)])
(which
is always true).
44This value is smaller than the maximum value admissible for H that ensures a positive
value of W0Hr when 
0 > 1= (   1), that is H = 2L(1+
0)
[0( 1) 1] .
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and l0 = 2 (H + L) do not depend on  and where
t2 = L(
0 + 1)[0 ( + 1) +  + ] > 0;
t1 =  H0[0 (   1) +    ] < 0;
t0 = L(
0 + 1)[0 (   1) +    ] > 0
Given the sign of the parameters t2, t1 and t0 specied above, expression
t2
2+t1+t0 in the denominator is a parabola with positive value t0 when  =
0.45 Moreover, we know that expression l2 (0)
2 + l1
0 + l0 in the numerator
must be positive to have W0Hr > 0, and that expression t2
2 + t1 + t0 in
the denominator must be positive to have W0Hv > 0 when workers are all
agglomerated in r. The analysis is similar as in the additive case (Section
4.2). The numerator of the argument of the logarithm can be represented by
an increasing function in  which take the value 0 when  = 0: This term is
represented by the dotted curve in Figure I already used in Appendix II.A.
Comparing the doted curve with the curve representing the denominator in
the logarithm of (71), we conclude that we can have either: 1) stable full
agglomeration for intermediate values of  when the second higher parabola
lies below the dotted curve or 2) a stable full agglomeration for high level of
economic integration comparing the lowest parabola with the dotted curve.
Finally, the case represented by the higher parabola, which says that full
agglomeration is never stable, independently of , is excluded. Hence, we
can state what written in the second Proposition (on full agglomeration) in
Section 6.2.
III.B. Segregated network
In the case of the segregated network hHr = Hr, lLr = L and hLr =
lHr = 0, and the system in (64) obtained with the additive specication can
be solved to nd that the individual demands by each skilled and unskilled
worker in r are, respectively, given by
XHr = 
1 + 0
1 + 0
wHr
pXr
and XLr = 
1 + 0
1 + 0
1
pXr
(72)
Then, the indirect utility function (23) in the case of skilled workers can be
rewritten as follows
U(AHr ; (XHr ; X ir)) = 
wHr
(pXr)

(1 + 0)
1 + 0
45Its minimum value is attained at  =   t12t2 = H
0
2L(0+1) > 0.
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with the logarithm of the ratio of the current indirect utility levels in region
r with respect to region v given by
V s (Hr; ; 
0) = ln

pXv
pXr

wHr
wHv

Substituting (72) into (13) we nd the same expressions for Xrr(s) and
Xrv(s) obtained in the case of the average complete network in (67) and
(68). Hence, also the wages of skilled in the two regions are equivalent to
those obtained in the complete average specication (69). Nevertheless, the
expression for the indirect utility function is di¤erent and the logarithm of
the ratio of the current indirect utility levels in region r with respect to region
v in (32) for skilled workers is given by the following expression
V s (Hr; ; 
0) = ln

pXv
pXr
 Hv[(2+1)(0+1)+( 1)(+1)(0+1)]+2(0+1)Hr
Hr[(2+1)(0+1)+( 1)(+1)(0+1)]+2(0+1)Hv

(73)
Then, V s (Hr; ; 0) in (73) is used to evaluate the stability of the sym-
metric and the fully agglomerated equilibria. The derivative of V s (Hr; ; 0)
with respect to Hr evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, is given by the
following expression
V sHr (H=2; ; 
0) = 4(1 )
H( 1)(1+)f[++0(+1)]+ +0( 1)gZ
with Z =  (   1 + ) [ + + 0 ( + 1)] (   1  ) [   + 0 (   1)] :
Direct computation shows that the faction is always positive when  2 [0; 1)
and is equal to zero when  = 1. Thus, when  2 [0; 1), the sign of
V sHr (H=2; ; 
0) depends on that of Z. Given that    1 > ,46 we know
that Z is positive if  2 (sb; 1) with sb denoting the break point in the case
under scrutiny with 0 < sb  ( 1 )[ +
0( 1)]
( 1+)[++0(+1)] < 1. On the other hand,
Z is negative if  2 [0; sb). Importantly, sb is smaller than the corresponding
value found for 0 = 0, and sb: is a decreasing function of 
0. As increases
in 0 reduce the breakpoint sb; and thus the width of the range  2 [0; sb)
for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable, we can state that relative con-
cerns destabilize the symmetric equilibrium and favors agglomeration. In
other words, the symmetric equilibrium is stable only for relatively low levels
46We recall that we assume that the no black hole condition corresponding to the case
of 0 = 0 holds:
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of economic integration, the lower the level the larger is 0. Finally, notice
that V sHr (H=2; ; 
0) is independent of L, as it happens in the case of the
additive specication, and also independent from of H.
We now focus on the other equilibrium. In the case of full agglomeration,
expression (73) can be manipulated to give
V s (H;; 0) = ln
"
2
1   1
++0(1+)
(1+0) 
2+
 +0( 1)
(1+0)
#
First, notice that V s (H;; 0) is not only independent of L, as it happens
in the case of the additive specication, but also independent of H. The
numerator in V s (H;; 0) is increasing in  2 [0; 1] from 0 when  = 0 to
2 when  = 1.47 Moreover, the denominator in V s (H;; 0) is a positive
upward opening parabola in , which takes its minimum value [    +
0 (   1)]= (1 + 0) > 0 when  = 0, and increases to 2 when  = 1.
Both numerator and denominator are represented in Figure IV , as a function
of .
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Figure IV
In Figure IV the continuous curve passing through the origin is the numera-
tor obtained for 0 = 0 while the continuous convex curve is the denominator
also for 0 = 0. In this case, full agglomeration is stable only for  larger
than the "sustain point" ss, where 
s
s corresponds to the intersection between
the two curves in the range  2 (0; 1). Increases in 0 shift downward the
parabola corresponding to the denominator, which represented by the dashed
47Let us recall that we assume that the no black hole condition corresponding to the
case of 0 = 0 holds, that is  <    1.
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line. Note that for  = 1; the argument of the logarithm in V s (H; 1; 0) is
still equal to 1. However, given that the minimum value attained by the
parabola in the denominator when  = 0 decreases with 0, we nd that the
sustain point ss dening the interval  2 [ss; 1) for which full agglomeration
is stable, decreases with 0.
The results obtained in the case of the segregated network without group
size e¤ects are summarized in the Proposition in Section 6.3.
III.C. Star network
In the case of the star network hLr = Hr=L, lHr = 1 and hHr = lLr = 0,
and the system in (64) can be solved to nd the individual demand by each
skilled worker in r
XHr =

pXr
(1+0)[wHr (1+0)+0(1 )]
(1+0)[1+(2 )0] (74)
and the individual demand by each unskilled worker in r
XLr =

pXr
(1+0)[1+0+wHr0(1 )]
(1+0)[1+(2 )0] (75)
Then, the indirect utility function (23) in the case of skilled workers can be
rewritten as follows
U(AHr ; (XHr ; X ir)) =
(1+0)
(pXr )

fwHr [20+(0)2+1] 0(0+1)g
(20 0+1)(0+1)
while the logarithm of the ratio of the current indirect utility levels in region
r with respect to region v in (32) for skilled workers is given by
V  (Hr; ; 0) = ln
(
(pXv )

(pXr )


wHr 
0(0+1)
20+(0)2+1


wHv 
0(0+1)
20+(0)2+1

)
(76)
Making use of (74) and (75), we can rewrite expression (13) as follows
Xkr(s) =
pkr(s)
 
p1 Xr
 (1+
0)
(1+0)
L(0+1)+0Hr(1 )+wHr [Hr(0+1)+L0(1 )]
[(2 )0+1] (77)
Expression (77) is then used to rewrite the wage in (22) as follows
wHr =
(1+0)
(1+0)[(2 )0+1] (crwHr + dr + cvwHv + dv)
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with
cr =
[L0(1 )+(0+1)Hr]
Hr+Hv
, cv =
[L0(1 )+(0+1)Hv ]
(Hv+Hr)
,
dr =
(0+1)L+0(1 )Hr
Hr+Hv
and dv =
(0+1)L+0(1 )Hv
(Hv+Hr)
Writing an analogous expression for wHv , we can solve the system of two
equations in two unknowns wHr and wHv nding that
wHr =
(0+1)
(0+1)(1 0+20)
dr+dv+kcvdr(2 1)
(1 kcr)(1 kcv) 2k2crcv (78)
and
wHv =
(0+1)
(0+1)(1 0+20)
dv+dr+kcrdv(2 1)
(1 kcr)(1 kcv) 2k2crcv (79)
which can be substituted into (76) to nd V  (Hr; ; 0).
The derivative of V  (Hr; ; 0) in (76) with respect to Hr evaluated at
the symmetric equilibrium is given by the following expression
V Hr (H=2; ; 
0) =
4(1 )(s1+s0)
(1+)H( 1)(h1+h0)
where the coe¢ cients s1, s

0, h

1 and h

0 are all functions of , , H, 
0 and
L, and V Hr (H=2; 1; 
0) = 0.
As in Section 5.2, we focus the analysis on the calibrated model with
parameters H = 10,  = 2,  = 0:11 and L = 20. Figure V:a compares the
value of V Hr (H=2; ; 
0) as a function of  in the case of  = 0 (black curve),
 = 0:02 (red curve),  = 0:04 (blue curve),  = 0:06 (green curve) and
 = 0:08 (yellow curve), the same parameters that are considered in Figure
1:b. The numerical analysis shows that the introduction of weak relative
concerns (small 0) in the star network without group size e¤ects destabilizes
the symmetric equilibrium for low values of integration  while they have no
e¤ect for high levels of .
Finally we consider the full agglomeration equilibrium. The value of
V  (Hr; ; 0) in (76) when all skilled workers are located in region r can be
written as follows:
V (H;; 0) = ln 

 1 + ln

wHr 
0(0+1)
20+(0)2+1


wHv 
0(0+1)
20+(0)2+1
 (80)
Indeed, ln
pXv
pXr
= ln 

 1and the skilled wages with full agglomeration in r
can be obtained respectively from (78) and (79).
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Direct computation shows that V (H; 1; 0) = 0 when  = 1, while when
! 0 (that is, in autarky), V  (H; 0; 0)!  1. This behavior implies that
full agglomeration in r is never sustainable with low values of . Then, con-
sidering the same calibrated model with the same parameters as in Figure
V:a; the curve representing V (H;; 0) in Figure V:b show that full agglom-
eration is stable only for high level of integration : Figure V:b also shows
that increases in the value of 0 allows full agglomeration to be stable for
lower levels of integration  (which is in line with the e¤ects described in
Figure V:a).
The results obtained in the case of the multiple star network without
group size e¤ects are summarized in the Proposition in Section 6.4.
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